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ABSTRACT
Buhrmann, Jacklyn R. Ph.D., Purdue University, August 2018. Three Essays on Skill
Heterogeneity in Frictional Labor Markets. Major Professor: Cathy M. Zhang.
This dissertation is composed of three essays using labor search models to explore the role of skill mismatch in the labor market. The ﬁrst, “Skill Mismatch
in Frictional Labor Markets”, provides theory and evidence on pair-speciﬁc skill
mismatch in the labor market, deﬁned as the gap between an individual’s skills and
the requirements of her job. Employment data from the NLSY97 display some degree
of positive sorting into occupations on the basis of cognitive skills, but skill mismatch
is pervasive and costly. I develop and estimate a labor search model featuring heterogeneity in worker skills and ﬁrm skill requirements that demonstrates how search
frictions induce voluntary mismatch acceptance. In addition, the model indicates that
skill mismatch is countercyclical; as the labor market tightens, mismatch tolerance
falls and wages rise for all workers. However, the elasticity of mismatch tolerance
with respect to market tightness varies systematically across the skill space, leading
to changes in the composition of employment over the business cycle.
While the model generates levels of mismatch broadly consistent with the data, the
degree of positive sorting is underestimated for higher-skilled workers. The second
chapter, “Targeted Search in Heterogeneous Labor Markets”, extends the
theory of targeted search by introducing continuous skill heterogeneity among workers
and ﬁrms in frictional labor markets. Workers are unable to fully direct their search,
but instead pay an information cost to reduce the variance of the job oﬀer distribution.
A lower variance increases the worker’s expected match quality but decreases the oﬀer
arrival rate. Results show higher-skilled workers target their search more intensely,

xi
decreasing the expected level of mismatch among higher-skilled workers and allowing
the model to better ﬁt the data on skill mismatch and sorting.
The third chapter, “Skill Mismatch and the Equilibrium Distribution of
Vacancies”, builds on the model in the ﬁrst chapter by endogenizing the skill distribution of vacancies. The model generates an equilibrium distribution of vacancies
in the skill space that depends on labor market conditions such as bargaining power,
matching eﬃciency, and the distribution of unemployed workers. Job creation depends critically on mismatch tolerance: higher levels of expected mismatch reduce
the expected value of a vacancy. The model provides new predictions on the response
of job creation to the skill distribution of unemployed workers, which can be tested
using data on job postings by occupation.

1

1. SKILL MISMATCH IN FRICTIONAL LABOR
MARKETS
1.1

Introduction
Skill mismatch in the labor market arises when individuals are employed in jobs

with skill requirements that don’t align with the skills the worker oﬀers. For example,
a restaurant server with a bachelor’s degree in accounting is likely mismatched, since
his education level is higher than the job requires. However, educational requirements
are not the only indicator of mismatch. A high school teacher with a bachelor’s degree
in accounting may also be mismatched, if his job is unable to utilize all of his skills. In
this sense, skill mismatch is a continuous, pair-speciﬁc measure describing the quality
(or lack thereof) of a particular worker-job match.
Recent empirical studies show that skill mismatch is costly to workers in terms
of forgone wages and shorter job tenure [Lise and Postel-Vinay, 2015]. Individuals
who are poorly matched – either over- or under-skilled relative to the requirements
of their occupation – earn lower wages than similarly-skilled workers who are better
matched. When multiple dimensions of skill are considered, mismatch in the cognitive
skill dimension is shown to be most costly; the wage loss from mismatch is large, and
cognitive skills are very slow to accumulate. Additionally, the consequences of skill
mismatch are long-lasting; workers who are mismatched have shorter job tenure on
average and earn lower future wages even after switching occupations [Guvenen et al.,
2015]. Skill mismatch is also costly at the aggregate level. Gautier and Teulings [2015]
show that output would be 7.5% to 18.5% higher in the absence of search frictions,
and estimate that 60% of this output loss can be attributed to mismatch.
Given the undesirable eﬀects of mismatch on individual as well as aggregate outcomes, it is important to understand workers’ mismatch tolerance decisions. How
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much skill mismatch do workers accept? What causes the systematic diﬀerences in
mismatch across diﬀerent types of workers? How does mismatch change over the
business cycle?
This paper presents three stylized facts describing the cognitive skill mismatch
existing in the U.S. labor market as a function of workers’ skill level, and develops
a search and matching model to replicate these facts. Mismatch is measured on the
basis of cognitive skills, using data from the 1997 cohort of the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth (NLSY97) and the U.S. Department of Labor’s O*NET database.
In contrast to Lise and Postel-Vinay [2015] and Guvenen et al. [2015], the mismatch
measure in this paper is one-dimensional. It focuses only on cognitive skills, since
mismatch in that dimension is most costly and therefore most likely to aﬀect workers’ job acceptance decisions. Comparing an individual’s cognitive skill with that of
their occupation, I quantify how much skill mismatch workers are willing to accept.
Because respondents in the NLSY97 are currently young, prime-age workers, it is
essential to understand the causes and consequences of skill mismatch among this
group. Results indicate mismatch is present among workers of all skill levels, but
higher-skilled workers tolerate more skill mismatch than lower-skilled workers since
the opportunity cost of unemployment is greater. Workers’ average wages decline as
mismatch increases; therefore, within-type wage dispersion is higher for higher-skilled
workers. In addition, higher-skilled workers experience shorter unemployment spells,
and are less likely to be unemployed at any time.
To capture these facts, I construct a labor search model that formalizes the workers’ tradeoﬀ between accepting an imperfect match and continuing to search. The
model builds oﬀ the canonical search-and-matching model of McCall [1970], augmented to allow for heterogeneity in the skills of both workers and ﬁrms. Skills are
distributed along the unit interval, and workers are vertically diﬀerentiated such that
a higher value indicates a more skilled worker. Wage oﬀers depend on the worker’s
type as well as the type of job with which she is matched; for each worker, there
is a single job type at which the wage is maximized. The model focuses on the
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worker’s problem; unemployed workers search randomly for jobs and receive oﬀers
according to a Poisson arrival rate. Upon receiving an oﬀer, an unemployed worker
chooses whether to begin employment with the current ﬁrm or to continue searching.
Crucially, it is not an equilibrium strategy to wait for a “perfect” match since the
probability of drawing any speciﬁc job is measure zero. Instead, workers will accept
some range of “good enough” matches.
The level of mismatch accepted is directly linked to the worker’s reservation wage,
which depends on labor market conditions such as the oﬀer arrival rate, separation
rate, and unemployment beneﬁts. When the reservation wage increases workers become more selective, accepting a narrower range of job oﬀers and tolerating less
mismatch. The model delivers two key predictions regarding skill mismatch. First,
mismatch is present among all types of workers, and the average level of mismatch
accepted is (weakly) increasing in the worker’s type. Second, mismatch tolerance
falls when workers’ outside option increases and when the cost of mismatch increases.
Therefore, decreases in the job separation rate and increases in unemployment beneﬁts, the arrival rate of job oﬀers, or increases in the curvature of the wage lead to a
decrease in mismatch.
When workers are able to search on-the-job, the qualitative results regarding sorting and skill mismatch still hold. Reservation wages fall and expected utility increases
for all workers. By gaining the opportunity to move up the job ladder, middle-skill
workers see a decrease in expected skill mismatch and an increase in expected wages
conditional on employment. High-skill and low-skill workers, on the other hand, experience increased mismatch and lower expected wages. However, there is still a
net gain in welfare among these groups of workers due to the increased employment
probability.
By making explicit the diﬀerences in the equilibrium strategies of workers with
diﬀerent skills, the model also provides a framework to study the eﬀects of changes
in labor market conditions on labor market outcomes like wages and unemployment.
Models without heterogeneity are generally very tractable and well-suited to address
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the response of the average worker. However, by neglecting diﬀerences in worker skills,
these models are unable to address the compositional changes that can occur. For
instance, there are two channels by which aggregate outcomes can change in response
to a shift in labor market conditions. First, workers’ reservation wage strategies may
change; in general, the reservation wages of all workers move in the same direction,
but some are more responsive than others. In addition, variation in the elasticity of
the reservation wage by skill leads to a change in the composition of employment.
Because outcomes such as average wages are systematically diﬀerent across diﬀerent
types of workers, this compositional eﬀect is relevant for the calculation of aggregate
statistics.
To understand whether the theory is consistent with the empirical facts on mismatch, the model is calibrated to the U.S. labor market using NLSY97 data from 2009
to 2013. The calibrated model generates match acceptance behaviors, unemployment
rates, and wage diﬀerentials that are broadly consistent with the data. Moreover, the
model predicts some positive sorting on cognitive skills (the correlation between the
worker’s skill type and his expected job type is 0.95), but there is also a substantial
amount of mismatch. On average, a worker’s expected level of skill mismatch is 0.24,
or nearly one quartile in the cognitive skill space. While workers in the lower half
of the skill space are under-skilled in expectation and workers in the upper half are
over-skilled, workers of all skill types are willing to match with jobs both above and
below their own skill type.
Solon et al. [1994] and Daly and Hobijn [2016] use PSID and CPS data, respectively, to show that the lack of cyclicality in the average wage is attributable to changes
in the skill composition of the employed population. The current model highlights
the role of mismatch tolerance in explaining this composition eﬀect. In the model,
higher-skilled workers are more responsive to changes in labor market conditions than
low-skilled workers. When unemployment falls (or when the market tightens), average wages for all workers rise, but the increased employment shares of lower-skilled
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workers pushes down the economy-wide average wage. Consequently, growth of the
economy-wide average wage is essentially uncorrelated with market tightness.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 constructs an empirical measure of skill mismatch and describes four facts about skill and skill mismatch
in the U.S. labor market. Section 3 presents a model of one-sided search with heterogeneity, and Section 4 illustrates the decentralized equilibrium solution in a calibrated
numerical example. Section 5 shows the eﬀect of employment composition on the aggregate wage during the recovery from the Great Recession. Section 6 considers an
extension with on-the-job search. Section 7 concludes and oﬀers directions for future
work.

1.1.1

Related Literature

Recent empirical work has focuses on describing the eﬀects of skill mismatch.
Guvenen et al. [2015] propose a multidimensional measure of skill mismatch and a
model in which workers learn about their abilities over time, and use it to show that
mismatch is costly in terms of both current and future wages as well as expected
job tenure. Lindenlaub [2017] estimates an assignment model with multidimensional
skills and ﬁnds that changes in technology have contributed to a strong increase in
skill complementaries and in the cost of skill mismatch. These studies, along with
Lise and Postel-Vinay [2015], show that skill mismatch is a widespread phenomenon in
the labor market, with strong negative consequences for workers. The current paper
contributes to this literature by quantifying the cognitive skill mismatch tolerated
across workers of diﬀerent skill levels.
A large search and matching literature has been devoted to modeling skill heterogeneity and sorting. Marimon and Zilibotti [1999] was among the ﬁrst to introduce
a continuum of worker and ﬁrm types. Their model is made tractable by the fact
that skills are situated around a unit circle, so the decision problem and equilibrium
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strategy are symmetric across workers. The primary drawback of this model is the
inability to address qualitative diﬀerences between diﬀerent types of workers or jobs.
Search models with a heirarchy of types have been studied, primarily in marriage
market applications, beginning with Shimer and Smith [2000] and Shimer and Smith
[2001]. Studies incorporate two-sided heterogeneity with identical value functions
and a ﬁxed pool of agents on each side of the market. Teulings and Gautier [2004]
extend the model to a labor market setting comparable to the Diamond-MortensenPissarides framework, and specify an increasing returns to scale matching process in
order to approximate the decentralized equilibrium solution and estimate the distortions resulting from search frictions. When equilibrium wages are obtained through
Nash bargaining over the total surplus, the worker’s incentives are fundamentally
unchanged by the inclusion of ﬁrms in the model. As a result, the one-sided search
problem studied in the current paper allows for structural estimation of the parameters while keeping workers’ strategies and outcomes unchanged.
Lise et al. [2016] incorporate productivity shocks and on-the-job search with
counter oﬀers into the environment of Shimer and Smith [2000] to estimate the welfare
costs of mismatch and explore optimal regulation. They estimate a signiﬁcant skill
complementarity among college-educated workers, and a low complementarity among
workers with a high school education or less. The resulting model-predicted match
sets for college educated workers align well with the stylized facts described in this
paper. However, they predict virtually no sorting among high school educated workers, while the empirical match sets I plot show that lower-skilled workers also exhibit
some positive sorting (albeit less strongly) on cognitive skills. Lise and Postel-Vinay
[2015] augment the model to allow for multidimensional skills and skill accumulation,
and estimate the costs of skill mismatch using the NLSY79 and O*Net datasets. In a
related framework, Lise and Robin [2017] attempt to quantify the cyclical dynamics of
sorting using a two-sided search model estimated using long-run aggregate moments.
However, wage setting and match formation rely on ﬁrms engaging in Bertrand com-
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petition to poach workers. The resulting implications for mismatch tolerance are not
consistent with the evidence presented in the current paper.
Finally, Hagedorn et al. [2017] employ a similar model to prove that sorting can
be identiﬁed using wages from matched employer-employee data. Extending Shimer
and Smith [2000] to allow for on-the-job search, they show using German LIAB
data that more productive workers tend to be employed in more productive ﬁrms,
but that mismatch causes an output loss of 1.83%. In the current paper, I study
sorting in the cognitive skill dimension using publicly available U.S. data, providing a
complimentary answer to the question of sorting and mismatch in the labor market.

1.2

Skill Mismatch in the U.S. Labor Market
In this section, I construct empirical measures of worker and ﬁrm skills, and

summarize three main facts regarding skill mismatch in the labor market.

1.2.1

Data

The primary data source in this paper is the NLSY97. Conducted by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics, this nationally representative survey samples individuals born between 1980-1984. I restrict the analysis to the 2009-2013 waves of the survey; during
this time period, respondents are 25-33 years old. Skill mismatch may be an especially salient feature of the labor market at this time, since workers are likely be less
choosy about the jobs they accept during and after recessions. Because survey respondents are young, prime-age workers, it is particularly relevant to study the causes
and consequences of mismatch among this group. Of the initial 6,748 individuals in
the cross-sectional sample, approximately 6,000 are successfully contacted in 2009.
To account for selective attrition, I use custom sample weights calculated over the
subsample of individuals who appear in any wave between 2009-2013. Appendix A.3
discusses sample selection criteria and descriptive statistics for the relevant subsample.
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I obtain information on occupational skill requirements from O*NET, which provides information on 704 SOC-level occupations. Occupational codes in the NLSY97
are reported as 3- or 4-digit Census codes, a coarser taxonomy than used by the
SOC. For occupations that map to multiple SOC codes, I average the skill requirements of the relevant SOC occupations. For each occupation in O*NET, a “level”
and an “importance” score are provided for each of 277 descriptors. The level score
assigned to a skill indicates the degree of competency in that skill needed to succeed
at the occupation; the importance score describes how essential the skill is to the
occupation. For example, the skill “Mathematics” is rated as equally important for
both Physicists and Post-secondary Mathematics Teachers, but the level of the skill
required is substantially higher for Physicists. I rank occupations on the basis of the
level requirement for the skills of interest.

1.2.2

Empirical Methodology

Skill mismatch is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between a worker’s skill type and the
skill type of the occupation in which the worker is employed. For simplicity, both
skill types are represented by linear indices, x and y respectively. Skill mismatch is
deﬁned as x − y; a positive value indicates that the worker is over-skilled relative to
his job, and a negative value indicates that the worker is under-skilled. In order to
measure and describe skill mismatch in the labor market, measures of worker and job
skill types must ﬁrst be constructed.
To create a measure of skill comparable across individuals, I follow an approach
similar to Cawley et al. [2001]. During the ﬁrst round of the NLSY97, most respondents took the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) test. The
ASVAB consists of 12 component sections, over skills both abstract (eg. mathematics
knowledge, paragraph comprehension) and practical (eg. auto information). Scores
from four categories, mathematics knowledge, arithmetic reasoning, paragraph comprehension, and word knowledge, are residualized by age and gender, and a principal
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components analysis (PCA) is performed on the residuals. The individual’s percentile
rank in the ﬁrst principal component score is referred to as the ASVAB rank.
The ASVAB rank provides some information about a worker’s ability, but because the ASVAB was administered before most educational attainment decisions
were made it is likely that rankings have since shifted. To account for this, I combine the ASVAB rank with the respondent’s education level using PCA, where the
ﬁrst component is taken as the individual’s general ability. Finally, I recompute the
ranking of individuals using the custom sample weights previously described, and
normalize to obtain a skill type x ∈ [0, 1]. This method returns a ranking over individuals such that, conditional on education level, an individual with a higher ASVAB
rank is assigned a higher skill type.1 Figure 1.1 shows the distribution of educational
attainment within each percentile bin of worker skills, smoothed using nonparametric
local-constant least squares regressions. Workers classiﬁed as higher-skilled tend to
have higher levels of educational attainment, but the ordering is not perfect. It is
possible for a worker with a high school degree and a relatively high ASVAB rank to
be classiﬁed above a worker with a Bachelor’s degree and a low ASVAB rank. This
measure of skill diverges somewhat from the recent literature, which commonly uses
ASVAB or AFQT scores as a proxy for ability. Including education level in the construction of worker skills changes the ranking substantially. By including education
level, the correlation between worker skill and wage increases, and the aggregate level
of mismatch falls.
A job is equivalent to an occupation, or a group of tasks that the worker must
perform; data on the skills required for those tasks is included in O*NET. For the
purpose of this analysis, the skill type of a job is determined by the levels of the skills
“Judgment and Decision Making” (JDM) and “Complex Problem Solving” (CPS)
required by that occupation. JDM is the skill most strongly (positively) correlated
with the occupation’s median hourly wage. CPS is highly correlated with both JDM
1
See Appendix A.5 for a discussion and robustness checks of other ranking methods for worker and
occupation skills.
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Fig. 1.1.: Empirical probability of educational attainment by individual skill.

and the wage, and its inclusion serves to remove mass points in the occupation skill
distribution caused by clustering of skill requirement data around integer values.
These two skills are aggregated using PCA, and the ﬁrst principal component is taken
to be the cognitive skill requirement of the occupation. Occupations are weighted
according to their employment share in the NLSY97 and a ranking is computed; after
normalization, job skill types y also span the interval [0,1]. Skill mismatch can then
be calculated as the diﬀerence between the worker’s skill x and the skill y of the
occupation in which the worker is currently employed.

1.2.3

Empirical Facts of Skill Mismatch

Using the skill measures constructed in the previous section, I document three
stylized facts regarding workers’ match acceptance behavior and the presence of skill
mismatch in the labor market.
Fact 1 Higher-skilled workers earn higher incomes, but face increased within-type
wage dispersion.
Figure 1.2a plots the log of average hourly wage, and ﬁgure 1.2b shows the log
wage diﬀerentials between the 90th - 10th percentiles of hourly wage within each worker
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Fig. 1.2.: Empirical wage and wage dispersion by individual skill.

skill type. Workers are grouped into percentile bins such that the plotted points are
averages within each bin; the lines in each plot are best ﬁt quadratics.2 Average
hourly pay is increasing in worker skill; a one-decile increase in skill type increases
the hourly wage by $1.19 on average. However, workers face substantial within-type
wage diﬀerentials, which are larger among higher-skilled workers. The lowest-skilled
workers’ wages range from around $8 per hour at the 10th percentile to about $20 at
the 90th ; among the highest-skilled workers, the 10th and 90th percentile individuals
earn approximately $10 and $40 per hour, respectively. For each decile increase in
worker skill, the 90-10 wage diﬀerential increases by roughly $2 on average, and the
90-50 wage diﬀerential increases by $1.14. The increasing wage diﬀerential provides
preliminary evidence that higher-skilled workers are employed in a wider range of
jobs, and that not all of those jobs are able to fully utilize the workers’ skills.
The positive correlation between worker skill and hourly wage is consistent with
ﬁndings in the empirical literature dating back to Mincer [1974]. This well-established
result serves as evidence that the measure of worker skill constructed here captures
a salient worker characteristic. In addition, the increase in wage dispersion among
2

A skill percentile bin i contains workers whose skill type falls between the i and i + 1 percentile
of the skill space. For example, workers with skill x ∈ [.9, .91) fall into bin i = 90. There are on
average 54.3 individuals and 185.5 individual-job observations in each bin.
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higher-skilled workers is in line with the empirical literature, as discussed in Mortensen
[2005]. In his book, Mortensen characterizes wage dispersion as the amount of variation in wages that is not explained by worker traits, and summarizes empirical results
attributing much of the observed wage dispersion to search frictions.In line with this
result, the model presented in this paper generates wage dispersion through mismatch,
which is caused by search frictions.
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Fig. 1.3.: Empirical unemployment rate and duration by individual skill.

Fact 2 Higher-skilled workers are less likely to be unemployed and experience shorter
unemployment spells.
Figure 1.3 plots the average unemployment rate and unemployment duration by
worker skill type. The unemployment rate and expected duration are negatively
correlated with the workers’ skill type; a one-decile increase in skill type corresponds
to a 1.79 percentage point decrease in the unemployment rate and an unemployment
spell that is 1.17 weeks shorter. Fact 2 is in line with previous empirical ﬁndings;
for example, Becker [1993] show that unemployment rates are negatively correlated
with educational attainment, and Heckman et al. [2006] ﬁnd a negative relationship
between unemployment rates and their measure of cognitive ability. Along with Fact
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1, this helps to validate that the current measure of worker skill captures meaningful
variation across workers in the data.
Fact 3 There is some degree of positive sorting on the basis of cognitive skills, but
matching is not perfectly assortative. On average, there is more skill mismatch among
higher-skilled workers.
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Fig. 1.4.: Empirical match acceptance and average mismatch by individual skill.

Figure 1.4a depicts the range of occupation types each worker type matches with.
The ﬁgure plots the 95th , 75th 50th , 25th , and 5th percentiles of observed occupation
skills for each percentile bin of worker skill types. It is clear that some level of positive
sorting is present. For each decile increase in worker skill, the skill level of the median
occupation match increases by 5.6%, indicating that higher-skilled workers occupy
higher-skilled sets of occupations on average. However, the range of occupations held
by a particular type of worker can be quite large; on average, the diﬀerence between
a worker’s 95th and 5th percentile match is 78.3% of the occupation skill space.
Figure 1.4b plots the average of observed skill mismatch within each percentile of
worker type. Workers in the lower half of the skill space experience less skill mismatch
than higher-skilled workers. The expected level of mismatch for a worker at the 90th
percentile is 28.83% higher than a worker at the 50th percentile, and 26.89% higher
than a worker at the 10th percentile.
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Figures 1.5a and 1.5b depict the cost of skill mismatch in terms of forgone wages
and reduced job tenure. Since the number of individuals experiencing a particular
level of mismatch varies systematically across the space of potential mismatch, larger
markers are used to indicate larger groups of workers. Values of mismatch that are
less than 0 indicate that the worker’s skill index is lower than that of the occupation,
or that the worker is under-skilled; values greater than zero indicate that the worker
is over-skilled. It is clear that wages are decreasing in mismatch, whether the worker
is over- or under-skilled for his occupation. However, the duration of jobs in which
the worker is under-skilled is much longer than when he is over-skilled. Over-skilled
workers are more likely to be high-skilled; since the average wage is higher for highskilled workers, the incentive to ﬁnd a better matched job is larger. Together, these
two facts show that mismatch is a salient feature of the labor market.
The relatively high level of mismatch observed among higher-skilled workers may
be surprising at ﬁrst, since higher-skilled workers face a higher opportunity cost of mismatch. However, the opportunity cost of unemployment is also higher for high-skilled
workers. Unemployment beneﬁt policies attempt to alleviate this by subsidizing job
search, but Fact 3 shows that many high-skilled workers are still willing to accept a
poor match in order to exit unemployment more quickly. In the remainder of this
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paper, I construct a random search model to explain workers’ mismatch acceptance
behaviors, and use the model to show how heterogeneity in mismatch acceptance
strategies leads to important compositional eﬀects for aggregate labor market outcomes.

1.3

A Model of Job Search and Skill Mismatch
To capture the diﬀerences across workers in the expected value of future job oﬀers,

I augment the continuous-time, one-sided search environment of McCall [1970] to allow for heterogeneity on both sides of the labor market. Workers are risk-neutral and
inﬁnitely-lived, and maximize expected discounted utility which is linear in income.
A worker can be either employed or unemployed at any time; all unemployed workers
search for jobs, and there is no on-the-job search in the baseline model. Section 6
extends this model to allow for on-the-job search. The extended model provides additional predictions and comparative statics results, but the central results regarding
skill mismatch tolerance still hold. In this model, a ﬁrm corresponds to one job and
may be either vacant (searching for a worker) or ﬁlled.
Search frictions in the labor market make job search costly by forcing workers
to wait in the low-value state of unemployment until they receive an acceptable job
oﬀer. Once a worker receives a job oﬀer, she must decide whether to accept it or to
continue searching for a better oﬀer. This tradeoﬀ depends critically on the value of
the oﬀers that a worker expects to receive in the future. When that expectation is
a function of the worker’s ability or skill, workers of diﬀerent skill levels will make
systematically diﬀerent decisions regarding the range of job oﬀers to accept.
Skill Heterogeneity. Workers are heterogeneous in skills, indexed by type x ∈
[0, 1], such that higher x indicates a more skilled worker. Firms are also heterogeneous,
indexed by skill requirements y ∈ [0, 1]. Worker skill types x and skill requirements
of vacant jobs y are distributed according to cdf’s L and G, with corresponding pdfs
`(x) and g(y). The distributions of unemployed and employed workers depend on the
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workers’ decision problem, and are not necessarily equal to L; call these distributions
F and Fe, respectively. The ﬁrm distribution G includes only vacant ﬁrms, and the
distribution of vacancies is assumed to be invariant to worker behavior3 .
Job Search. All unemployed workers receive job oﬀers at a Poisson rate λ. Search
is random; that is, the probability of meeting job y is independent of the worker’s type
x4 . Since workers cannot determine a potential employer’s type prior to receiving an
oﬀer, oﬀers are randomly drawn from the distribution of vacant jobs G(y). When
an oﬀer arrives, the worker must decide whether to accept or reject the job. While
unemployed, workers receive a ﬂow of beneﬁts b(x) ≥ 0. Workers who are employed
receive wages w(x, y) that depend on the worker’s own skill type as well as the skill
type of her job. Utility is obtained only from consumption, so the wage fully summarizes the attractiveness of any particular match. Matches are exogenously separated
according to a Poisson process with arrival rate s, which is constant across all worker
types. When a match is separated, the job is terminated and the worker becomes
unemployed. Workers discount future utility at rate r. See Figure 1.6 for a diagram
of the timing of events.
Wage. Let the wage earned by worker x when employed by ﬁrm y be given by
w(x, y). Deﬁne µ = |x − y| as the skill mismatch of the pair. The wage function must
satisfy the following properties:
1. w(x, y) ≥ 0 ∀(x, y)
2. Given x = x0 , w(x0 , y) quasiconcave in y
3
See Albrecht and Vroman [2002] for an example of endogenous vacancy creation with two types of
workers and ﬁrms, where ﬁrms respond to the distribution of unemployed workers as well as their
mismatch tolerance strategies.
4
Random search is important to generate skill mismatch in a bilateral matching environment where
mismatch is costly. Under competitive search, skill mismatch can exist only when a worker is
indiﬀerent across many job types and levels of mismatch. See Shi [2002] for a competitive search
model with heterogeneous workers.
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Fig. 1.6.: Timeline of events in model.

Condition (1) simply imposes a minimum wage of 0. Convexity of match sets is
ensured by (2); that is, if x is willing to accept jobs y1 and y2 , they should also accept
all y ∈ (y1 , y2 ).

1.3.1

Equilibrium

The equilibrium strategy for a worker of type x is to choose a reservation wage,
w∗ (x), such that job oﬀers are accepted if and only if the wage is greater than or equal
to w∗ (x). The reservation wage depends on the worker’s skill type x, and the set of
reservation wage strategies {w∗ (x)}x∈[0,1] is suﬃcient to characterize the equilibrium
in this environment. All proofs can be found in Appendix A.
Value Functions. Deﬁne E(x, y) as the value of employment for a worker of type
x employed by ﬁrm y. The employed worker receives wage w(x, y) from the current
job, and has a continuation value of either E(x, y) if the job continues or U (x) if the
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job is terminated. In this context, a worker’s equilibrium strategy is characterized by
a range of ﬁrms [y, y] with which to accept employment. However, the worker’s utility
depends only on the wage; given the wage, the employer type is irrelevant. Therefore,
it is equivalent to rewrite the worker’s value function in terms of the wage oﬀer w
rather than the ﬁrm type y. Using this transformation, the worker’s equilibrium
strategy is reduced to a simple reservation wage. The value of employment for worker
x in a match that pays w is
E(x, w) =

w + s · U (x)
r+s

(1.1)

Next, I construct the value function for an unemployed worker. The unemployed
worker receives the ﬂow value of unemployment b(x); the continuation value depends
on whether an acceptable job oﬀer arrives. An oﬀer w arrives at rate λ, and is
accepted if and only if the value of employment E(x, w) is greater than the value of
remaining unemployed. The ex-ante value of an oﬀer is an expectation with respect
to the conditional distribution of wages. If no oﬀer arrives, the continuation value is
simply the value of unemployment. The ﬂow value of unemployment is
Z w
e(w|x)
rU (x) = b(x) + λ
max{E(x, w) − U (x), 0} dG

(1.2)

w

e
where G(w|x)
is the distribution of wage oﬀers conditional on the worker’s type.
This distribution is a transformation of the distribution of jobs, G(y), given the wage
e
oﬀer function w(x, y). If the wage function is invertible, G(w|x)
= G(w−1 (w|x)).
However, w(x, y) may be a many-to-one function of y, so w−1 (w|x) may be a relation
rather than a function. If the second derivative of w(x, y) is constant in y, the
e
=
relation w−1 (w|x) will assign at most two y values for each w. In this case, G(w|x)
G(max{w−1 (w|x)}) − G(min{w−1 (w|x)}).
Reservation Wage. It is in a worker’s interest to accept all jobs such that the value
of employment in that job is at least as great as the worker’s value of unemployment,
or E(x, w) ≥ U (x). Therefore, the lowest wage a worker will accept is the one that
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sets the value of employment exactly equal to the value of unemployment. This wage,
denoted w∗ (x), is called the reservation wage. The worker’s equilibrium strategy is
to accept all jobs that oﬀer a wage greater than or equal to the reservation wage.
e(w|x), so the
No two types of workers face the same distribution of possible wages G
value of unemployment is a function of the worker’s type:
w∗ (x) + sU (x)
= U (x).
r+s
This implies that the reservation wage is equal to the ﬂow value of unemployment,
or w∗ (x) = rU (x). Returning to equation 1.2,
Z w
∗
e(w|x).
w (x) = b(x) + λ
max{E(x, w) − U (x), 0} dG

(1.3)

w

Proposition 1.3.1 The strategy of a type x worker is to accept a wage oﬀer if and
only if it is greater than the reservation wage w∗ (x), implicitly deﬁned by
Z w

λ
∗
e(w|x) dw
w (x) = b(x) +
1−G
r + s w∗ (x)

(1.4)

There is a unique solution to (1.4). This is suﬃcient to characterize match sets,
expected wages, and unemployment rates as a function of x, given the labor market
parameters b(x), λ, r, and s, the wage function w(x, y), and the distribution of vacant
jobs G(y).
Equation (1.4) implicitly pins down the reservation wage w∗ (x) as a function of
e. Deﬁne the match
b(x), λ, r, and s, given the conditional distribution of wages G
acceptance indicator function 1(x, y) to summarize the workers’ acceptance strategy.
⎧
⎨ 1 if w(x, y) ≥ w∗ (x)
1(x, y) =
(1.5)
⎩ 0 otherwise
The expected wage of an employed worker is
R1
w(x, y)1(x, y)g(y) dy
w(x) = 0 R 1
1(x, y)g(y)dy
0
and the expected accepted mismatch is given by
R1
|x − y|1(x, y)g(y) dy
µ(x) = 0 R 1
1(x, y)g(y)dy
0

(1.6)

(1.7)
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Unemployment. The hazard rate from unemployment to employment is the rate
at which an acceptable job oﬀer arrives, which is equal to the oﬀer rate multiplied by
the probability that the oﬀer comes from a ﬁrm in the acceptable range.
Z 1
�

∗
e(w (x)|x)] = λ G(y(x)) − G(y(x)) = λ
H(x) = λ[1 − G
1(x, y)g(y) dy
0

Let u(x) denote the unemployment rate for a worker of type x. Equilibrium unemployment rates are given by a steady-state condition on the unemployment rate
of each worker type. In steady state where unemployment is constant over time,
aggregate ﬂows into and out of unemployment must be equal.
u̇(x) = s(1 − u(x)) − u(x)H(x) = 0
Therefore, the equilibrium unemployment rate for worker type x is given by
u(x) =

s
s + H(x)

(1.8)

Deﬁne the aggregate unemployment rate u as the total measure of unemployed workers in the economy,
1

Z
u=

u(x) dx
0

The pdf of unemployed workers is then given by f (x) =
workers is fe(x) =

1.4

u(x)
u

while the pdf of employed

1−u(x)
.
1−u

Quantitative Analysis
Using the reservation wage equation (1.4), I provide a calibrated example of the

equilibrium outcome. To align the results with the empirical facts presented in Section
2, workers and ﬁrms are uniformly distributed over the unit interval; L(x) = G(y) =
U (0, 1).
To deliver predictions consistent with the stylized facts in Section 1.2, two additional assumptions are now imposed on the wage equation:
1. wx > 0
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2. ∀ x0 , ∃ y0 ∈ [0, 1] 3 wy (x0 , y0 ) = 0
where wx and wy indicate the partial derivatives of w with respect to x and y. The
ﬁrst assumption is that higher-skilled workers have the ability to earn more. However,
there exist some (low-skilled) jobs in which higher-skilled workers may earn less than
lower-skilled workers. The second assumption is that there exists a “best” job for
each type of worker at which the worker’s wage is maximized. These restrictions
ensure that wages in the model reﬂect those in the data, and are informed by the
empirical results in this paper as well as results in Guvenen et al. [2015] and theoretical
predictions of Eeckhout and Kircher [2011] among others. These conditions, while
not necessary to obtain an equilibrium solution, are key in generating the meaningful
diﬀerences in the outcomes of workers across diﬀerent skill levels.
For the numerical exercise in this section, let wages for each worker-ﬁrm pair be
given by
w(x, y) = x − δ(x − y)2
Here, δ is a scalar representing the substitutability of skills. Increasing δ ampliﬁes the
penalty for mismatch, decreasing the range of jobs with which a worker can proﬁtably
match. This simple function embodies the empirical results regarding wages and skill
mismatch: higher-skilled workers typically earn higher wages, but wages depend also
on the type of ﬁrm the worker is matched with and the associated match quality. Not
only is this consistent with the empirical literature, but it is intuitive as well. Higherskilled workers possess more human capital and have the potential to be produce
more by matching with more productive jobs. In matches with x > y, workers do not
produce up to their full potential, leading to lower wages. In matches with x < y,
workers may not produce to the full potential of the jobs they occupy. Therefore,
ﬁrms may require a larger share of the surplus in this type of match to compensate
for the output foregone by hiring an under-skilled worker, again leading to lower wages
for mismatched workers. Figure 1.5a shows that the wage penalties for positive and
negative mismatch are similar in the data, so for simplicity the wage loss due to
mismatch is assumed to be symmetric in this exercise.
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The unemployment beneﬁt function is
b(x) = b0 + b1 x
By conditioning beneﬁts on x, the unemployment beneﬁt adjusts to better match the
workers’ expected wages, while keeping the worker’s value of unemployment independent of previous employment history.5

1.4.1

Calibration

I use the 2009 to 2013 waves of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 to
calibrate several parameters for this example; at this time, respondents are between
the ages of 25-33 years old. Sample selection criteria are as described in Section 2, and
sample weights are used to account for selective attrition. The model is calibrated at
monthly frequency. Calibrated parameter values used for the numerical example are
presented in Table 1.1.

Table 1.1.: Calibrated parameter values in baseline model.
Parameter

Value

Target

b0

0

(Normalization)

b1

0.4

Beneﬁts Accuracy Measurement

r

0.001

3-month Treasury bill

s

0.0299

(Job duration)−1

λ

0.5010

u = .0824, D90,50 = 1.3771

δ

0.1003

u = .0824, D90,50 = 1.3771

For simplicity, workers have no base value of leisure; b0 is set to 0. The monthly interest rate r is chosen to match the average 3-month treasury bill rate from 2009-2013.
Other parameters are calibrated using data from the NLSY97. The average reported
5

Lise et al. [2016] also assume beneﬁts are a function of only the worker’s type; Marimon and Zilibotti
[1999] and Teulings and Gautier [2004] set equal beneﬁts for all worker types.
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job tenure is 33.50 months, leading to a separation rate of s = 0.0299. The U.S.
Department of Labor’s Oﬃce of Unemployment Insurance releases a yearly Beneﬁt
Accuracy Measurement report containing each state’s quarterly UI replacement rate.
From 2009 to 2013, the weighted average U.S. replacement rate was between 0.405
and 0.470. To provide conservative estimates of the remaining parameters, b1 = 0.4.
I use the Method of Moments to jointly calibrate λ and δ, matching the aggregate
R1
unemployment rate u = 0 u(x) dL(x) and the ratio of high-skill to median-skill maxmean wage dispersion D90,50 .6 Letting wim denote the mth percentile of the hourly
wage distribution for a skill percentile bin i, I estimate the max-mean wage dispersion
in the data by regressing
zi = β0 + β1 (wi90 − wi50 )
using the 90th percentile wage rather than the 100th to represent the max wage in
order to correct for potential misreporting and/or extreme cases. The max-mean
wage dispersion ratio is then calculated as
D90,50 =
⎡
Letting the parameter vector be θ = ⎣

λ
δ

⎤

ẑ90
ẑ50
⎡

⎦ and the moment vector be M = ⎣

u
D90,50

⎤
⎦,

0

the loss function J(θ) = (M − M̂ (θ)) W (M − M̂ (θ)) is minimized to obtain the calˆ (θ) represents the model-predicted values for the moibrated values for λ and δ. M
ments given the parameter vector θ, and the weighting matrix W is set to the identity
matrix.
Table 1.2 summarizes the eﬀect of increases in λ and δ on the moments of interest
to shed light on the identiﬁcation method. Holding δ ﬁxed, an increase in λ causes u
to fall because workers receive oﬀers more quickly; ﬁxing λ, an increase in δ causes u
to increase since workers become more selective as the wage at each possible job falls.
Therefore, the set of (λ, δ) such that u = .0824 is upward-sloping; higher values for λ
6

See Appendix A.3 for a discussion of moment and parameter calculation methods, moment identiﬁcation, and results under alternative moment choices.
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Table 1.2.: Eﬀects of λ and δ on u and D90,50 .
Δu ΔD90,50
↑λ

–

–

↑δ

+

–

require corresponding increases in δ to oﬀset the decrease in the unemployment rate.
To understand the set of (λ, δ) that maintain D90,50 , consider the eﬀects of λ and δ
on high-skill relative to median-skill workers. Increases in either λ or δ cause workers
to become more selective in accepting jobs. However, higher-skilled workers respond
more strongly to changes in λ and δ than do median-skill workers. Therefore, match
sets for high-skill workers become narrower relative to those of median skill workers,
decreasing the diﬀerence in wage dispersion between the two skill groups, D90,50 . This
results in a downward-sloping set of (λ, δ) to match D90,50 = 1.3771; an increase in
one parameter requires a decrease in the other to obtain the desired moment value.
Both the unemployment rate u and the ratio of wage dispersion D90,50 can be matched
individually by an inﬁnite set of (λ, δ) pairs. However, only one parameterization can
match the two moments simultaneously; see Figure 1.7.
Method of Moments

0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05

0.4

0.5
A

0.6

0.7

Fig. 1.7.: GMM identiﬁcation of (λ, δ).
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1.4.2

Results

To solve for the reservation wage for each type of worker, I iterate on equation
(1.4) until the function converges7 . The results are shown in the left panel of Figure
1.8. The worker’s maximum wage, x, is plotted on the same graph for reference. To
better illustrate the tradeoﬀs each worker faces, the right panel plots the mean wage
oﬀer, the reservation wage, and the expected accepted wage relative to each worker’s
max possible wage. It is clear that the reservation wage is increasing in the worker’s
type. This result is expected, because better workers are more productive.

Wages
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(a) Nominal wage
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(b) Relative to max wage.

Fig. 1.8.: Model predicted mean wage oﬀer, reservation wage, and expected wage by
individual skill.

However, because it is relatively more diﬃcult for workers near the ends of the
distribution to ﬁnd a job with low mismatch, the reservation wage is not linear. Figure
1.8 also shows the expected wage, conditional on being employed, for each type of
worker. This is equal to the expected productivity in equation (1.6), following the
initial assumption on wage setting. It is useful to note here that this is not equal
to the mean of the worker’s wage distribution, since the reservation wage truncates
7

An outline of the computational algorithm is discussed in Appendix A.2.
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the lower end of the distribution of wages for employed workers. For most workers,
the mean wage and the expected wage are very close. However, workers near the low
end of the skill space require a reservation wage higher than the mean of their wage
distribution, so the expected wage is above the mean wage as well.
Figure 1.9 shows the within-type wage dispersion generated by the model, represented by the diﬀerence between the 90th and 10th percentile of the accepted wage
oﬀer distribution for each worker type. Consistent with Fact 1 in the previous section,
there is more wage dispersion among higher-skilled workers.
Wage Differential
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0

0.2

0.4
0.6
Worker Type

0.8

Fig. 1.9.: Model predicted wage dispersion by individual skill.

Conditional on receiving an oﬀer, the probability that a worker of type x receives
e(wx∗ |x). Both the wage distribution and the
an acceptable job oﬀer is equal to 1 − G
reservation wage vary across x, so the probability of an acceptable oﬀer will also vary.
The aggregate acceptance rate is 75.59%. Since the NLSY does not contain data on
rejected job oﬀers, it is not possible to directly compare the simulated acceptance rate
to the data. However, the Survey of Unemployed Workers in New Jersey contains
data on the receipt and acceptance of job oﬀers for a sample of workers during 2009
and 2010; the average acceptance probability in this dataset is 79%.
The variation in acceptance probabilities implies that the expected length of an
unemployment spell is not the same across all worker types. The expected unemploy-
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ment rate and duration for each type of worker is plotted in Figure 1.10a. Consistent
with the stylized facts presented in Section 1.2, the average unemployment rate and
duration decrease in the workers’ skill type. Because the unemployment rate is not
constant for all types of workers, the distributions of employed and unemployed workers diﬀer from the overall worker type distribution L(x); in particular, the distribution
of unemployed workers is heavily skewed to the left.
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Fig. 1.10.: Model predicted employment outcomes by individual skill.

One of the main questions that the current model is designed to address is whether
search frictions can generate the level of mismatch observed in the data and explain
the diﬀerences in mismatch tolerance across worker skill types. In this example, the
level of mismatch associated with a wage w is given by |µ| = 1 − wx . Substituting in
the reservation wage yields the maximum level of mismatch a worker of type x will
accept.
The maximum and minimum ﬁrm types accepted by each type of worker are
plotted in Figure 1.11a; all matches between these two curves are accepted. Figure
1.11b shows that the accepted level of mismatch is monotonically increasing in worker
type. For workers near the upper end of the skill space, the diﬀerence between the
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Fig. 1.11.: Model predicted match acceptance and expected mismatch by individual
skill.

E(x, w) and U (x) is quite large, even for wages near the low end of the conditional
wage oﬀer distribution. On the other hand, this diﬀerence is relatively small for lowskilled workers. Because low-skilled workers give up less by remaining unemployed,
they are willing to wait longer for a better match. In fact, at the calibrated level of
unemployment beneﬁts, low-skilled workers are better oﬀ in unemployment than at
a job that pays the mean wage oﬀer. Workers accept job oﬀers from all ﬁrms with
mismatch less than or equal to |µ∗ | = 1 −

wx∗
.
x

While the workers’ equilibrium strategy varies based on the parameters, the model
is robust to changes in the calibration. Increasing the replacement rate b0 increases
all workers’ reservation wages; increasing the separation rate s decreases the value
of employment, causing an increase in reservation wages; increasing the oﬀer arrival
rate λ increases the value of unemployment, raising reservation wages; increasing
the mismatch penalty δ decreases the value of unemployment (through decreasing
the expected value of a job oﬀer), causing a decrease in the reservation wage. The
lone parameter that is capable of produce qualitative changes in the results is the
base level of unemployment beneﬁts b0 ; a value greater than 0 would be greater than
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the value of employment for some low-skilled workers, causing their reservation wage
to be greater than the max possible wage oﬀer and keeping them permanently in
unemployment.
Discussion. I assess the model by comparing the results from the calibrated model
to the stylized facts in Section 1.2. Figure 1.12a compares the match acceptance
sets observed in the data to those predicted by the model. To mitigate the eﬀects
of outliers in the data, the 95th and 5th percentiles of observed matches are used in
place of the maximum and minimum acceptable matches, and like Section 2 uses
nonparametric regressions to smooth the data. The ﬁgure plots the boundaries of
match acceptance and the median match accepted, with 90% conﬁdence intervals for
the ﬁtted values generated by the nonparametric regressions. The model is eﬀective
at predicting the lower bound of match acceptance, as well as the median match for
all but the highest-skilled workers. However, low-skilled workers in the model are too
selective relative to those in the data.
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Fig. 1.12.: Comparison of model vs data match sets and unemployment rates.

Consistent with the stylized facts, the model generates an unemployment rate
that decreases in the worker’s type, as shown in Figure 1.12b. Among workers above
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x = 0.5, the model-generated unemployment rate is on average 2.45% greater than
that in the data. For workers below the median, it is 4.7% too low on average. The
model prediction for the expected duration of unemployment is also broadly consistent
with the empirical facts; higher-skilled workers are expected to exit unemployment
more quickly.
These results highlight several similarities between the stylized facts and the model
predictions, as well as two distinct areas of divergence. The model predicts too much
selectivity among low-skilled workers, yet it is able to generate a relatively accurate
prediction of the median match. In contrast, the range of matches accepted by highskilled workers is successfully replicated, but the model predicts a median match that
is well below that in the data. Together, these two facts suggest that workers are able
to sort more eﬀectively than is allowed by the model. While random search provides
a simple and tractable way to generate non-singleton match sets, the results here
suggest that workers’ search is not perfectly random; the implications of a reﬁned
search strategy will be explored in subsequent work.
In this paper, workers’ search strategy is random. That is, workers have information on their own abilities, but are unable to discern whether a job is a good match
prior to meeting the ﬁrm or lack information on the location of good matches. A
frequently used alternative allows workers perfect information regarding all currently
vacant jobs, implying that the market for jobs is segmented by type. Typically, workers choose exactly one market8 to search in; Lagos [2000] and Shimer [2005b] are
classic examples. The observations in this section suggest a third alternative; perhaps workers have some information about the location and quality of jobs, but do
not have suﬃcient information to be able to successfully choose exactly which jobs
to search for.
Suppose that workers are able to target their search to jobs in the vicinity of their
ideal job. In expectation, job oﬀers will be close to the targeted type, but may also
8
Decreuse [2008] instead assumes that workers search in every submarket such that the total value
of the match is positive.
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come from jobs further away with decreasing probability. In this case, low-skilled
workers may meet and match with jobs for which they are substantially over-skilled,
but on average will sort into jobs near their ideal match. High-skilled workers will also
be able to sort into relatively high-type jobs, with the occasional match with low-type
ﬁrms. Targeted search can therefore explain both of the areas of discrepancy between
the stylized facts and the predictions from the model; the implications of this search
strategy will be explored in subsequent work.

1.4.3

Wages, Unemployment, and Mismatch During the Recovery

The empirical results in Section 1.2 highlight the fact that during the recovery
from the Great Recession many workers were willing to accept substantial skill mismatch, and therefore suﬀered wage penalties. In standard search models without
heterogeneity, as the labor market improves, workers’ reservation wages increase.
Higher reservation wages imply that average accepted wage also increases. However, the growth of the economy-wide average wage, represented by the median usual
weekly earnings reported each quarter by the BLS, was lower than expected during
much of the recovery. Despite the increasing vacancy rate and falling unemployment
rate, growth of the average wage remained below 2% for several years, well below its
long-run average of 3.25%.
In order to explain the lower-than-expected growth of the average wage, it is
necessary to break the link between the economy-wide average wage and the average
wage of an individual worker. Incorporating heterogeneity into a search model model
allows for diﬀerential responses to changing labor market conditions across worker
type. Changes in the average wage can then be separated into an intensive margin
(individual wage changes) and an extensive margin (composition of employment). In
this section, I show that the composition eﬀect dominated the individual wage eﬀect
during the recovery from the Great Recession, causing the observed change in the
average wage to be small.
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To decompose average wage growth, I derive the elasticity of the average wage with
respect to the contact rate λ, a proxy for market tightness in the one-sided model.
R1
Let w(x) denote the average wage for a worker of type x; then W = 0 w(x) dFe(x)
is the average wage across all workers in the economy. First, diﬀerentiate w(x) with
respect to λ.
∗

ge(w∗ (x)|x) dwdλ(x)
dw(x)
=
R
1
dλ

R1

(w − w∗ (x)) ge(w|x) dw
2
w
g
e
(w|x)
dw
∗
w (x)
w∗ (x)

(1.9)

Then diﬀerentiate w∗ (x).
R1
(w − w∗ (x))e
g (w|x) dw
dw∗ (x)
w∗ (x)
=
R1
dλ
r + s + λ w∗ (x) ge(w|x) dw

(1.10)

Figure 1.13a plots (1.10) across the skill space, using the calibrated parameter values
from Section 1.4.1 The reservation wage for all workers is increasing in λ. However,
higher-skilled workers respond more strongly to increases in the contact rate because
their expected gain from employment is larger.
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Fig. 1.13.: Derivative of reservation and average wage with respect to λ.
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Substituting (1.10) into (1.9),
dw(x)
=
dλ

ge(w∗ (x)|x)

R
1

(w − w∗ (x)) ge(w|x) dw
w∗ (x)
2
R
1
(r + s) w∗ (x) ge(w|x) dw

2
(1.11)

Figure 1.13b plots the (1.9). Because the change in the reservation wage is positive for
all workers, the average wage for each type of worker will increase with λ. However,
since the derivative of the reservation wage is increasing in x, the expected wage is
also steeper in λ for higher-skilled workers.
Turning now to the average wage across all x,
Z 1
Z 1
1
e
W =
w(x) dF (x) =
w(x)(1 − u(x)) dx
1−u 0
0
The derivative of the average wage with respect to λ is
Z 1
dW
dw(x) e
dfe(x)
=
f (x) + w(x)
dx
dλ
dλ
dλ
0

(1.12)

This accounts for not only the individual workers’ wage changes, but also the change
in the distribution of employed workers across the skill space. Diﬀerentiating the
unemployment rate u(x) with respect to λ,

R
1
dw∗ (x)
∗
−s w∗ (x) ge(w|x) dw − λge(w (x)|x) dλ
du(x)
=
2

R1
dλ
s + λ w∗ (x) ge(w|x) dw

(1.13)

There are two competing eﬀects of the contact rate on unemployment. Increasing
the contact rate increases the arrival rate of acceptable matches, decreasing the unemployment rate. At the same time, workers become more selective, dampening the
eﬀect of the contact rate on unemployment. In the calibrated example, shown in Figure 1.14, the net result is a modest decrease in unemployment that is larger for those
workers whose reservation wages are less elastic. Hence, the employment share of
higher-skilled workers drops, and that of lower-skilled workers increases. This change
in the composition of employment has a salient eﬀect on the average wage. Finally,
the change in aggregate unemployment is
Z 1
du
du(x)
=
dx
dλ
dλ
0

(1.14)
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Fig. 1.14.: Derivative of unemployment rate across the skill space.

The elasticity of the economy-wide average wage with respect to the contact rate is
d ln W
dW λ
=
·
d ln λ
dλ W
In the calibrated model, this elasticity is -0.0006. Although the reservation wages of
all workers increase, causing an increase in all workers’ average wages, the increase
in the economy-wide average wage though this channel is fully oﬀset by the change
in the composition of employment. Lower-skilled workers accept jobs at higher rates,
increasing their employment shares and decreasing the economy-wide average wage.
Imposing a standard Cobb-Douglas matching function with matching elasticity of
0.5, the implied elasticity of the average wage with respect to the unemployment
rate, given by equation (1.15) is 0.0009.
d ln W
dW dλ u
=
·
·
d ln u
dλ du W

(1.15)

This nearly-zero elasticity helps to explain why the rising vacancies and falling unemployment during the recovery were insuﬃcient to produce much growth in median
usual weekly earnings.
In contrast, the average of individual wage elasticity with respect to unemployment, given by
Z
0

1



dw(x) dλ u(x)
dλ du(x) w(x)


fe(x) dx

35
is -0.015. Nijkamp and Poot [2005] report that the range of estimates in the empirical
literature is -0.5 to +0.1, with a mean across 208 empirical estimates of -0.07. Without
accounting for compositional changes, the elasticity of the average wage,


Z 1
1
dw(x)
dλ u
(1 − u(x)) dx
du W
1 − u 0 dλ
would be -0.016, slightly larger than the average of individual wage elasticity since it
doesn’t adjust for diﬀerences across workers in the elasticity of unemployment with
respect to lambda.
Wage Growth in the Data The model calibration is based on U.S. data from
the NLSY97, covering 2009-2013. During this time period, the U.S. economy was
beginning to recover from the Great Recession. As the unemployment rate fell and
the vacancy rate rose, the contact rate for unemployed workers increased. Table 1.3
shows the key labor market variables in 2009 and in 2013. The unemployment rate
and average wage are given for the aggregate economy as well as for low-, mid-, and
high-skill workers, where each of these groups represents one-third of the worker skill
space.9
Using the elasticities derived in the beginning of this section, I explore whether
the model can generate the appropriate changes in unemployment and wages. For an
increase in the contact rate of 0.22, the model-predicted changes in unemployment,
mismatch, and wages are shown in Table 1.4.
Because wages in the model are normalized, I equate the standard deviation of log
wages in the data to the standard deviation of wages in the model to transform model
wages into dollars. Letting σndata and σnmodel be the respective standard deviations for
9

Jobs where the respondent worked less than 35 hours/week are dropped, following the BLS deﬁnition of full-time work. The aggregate vacancy rate, v is obtained by averaging the monthly vacancy
rate in the JOLTS report from the BLS. The aggregate unemployment rate, u, and the unemployment rates by skill group are calculated using NLSY97 data on weekly employment status. Market
tightness is calculated as uv , and the contact rate is imputed from the vacancy and unemployment
rates using a Cobb-Douglas matching function with matching elasticity 0.5.
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Table 1.3.: U.S. labor market in 2009 vs. 2013
2009

2013

Δ 2009-2013

Vacancy rate

1.83

2.78

0.95

Unemployment rate

9.56

6.07

-3.49

Low-skill

15.28 10.23

-5.05

Mid-skill

7.24

5.33

-1.91

High-skill

3.64

2.06

-1.58

Market tightness

0.19

0.46

0.27

Contact rate

0.41

0.63

0.22

Average wage

16.17 17.76

1.60

Low-skill

13.47 13.75

0.28

Mid-skill

15.56 16.48

0.91

High-skill

19.74 22.87

3.13

Table 1.4.: Empirical vs. model predicted changes, 2009 to 2013
Unemployment

Mismatch

Wage

Data

Model

Data

Model

Data

Model

Average

3.47%

-2.50%

-.0200

-.0283

$1.60

$1.57

Low-skill

-5.12

-3.42

-.0128

-.0189

0.28

1.26

Mid-skill

-1.95

-2.07

-.0200

-.0208

0.91

1.52

High-skill

-1.60

-1.98

-.0263

-.0447

3.13

3.10

worker group n (low-, mid-, or high-skill), and wndata be the average wage among group
n, the predicted wage change for group n is

 data 
σn
data
model
d
Δwn = exp log(wn ) + Δwn
− wndata
σnmodel
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The above formula predicts the new log wage in the data, exponentiates to get the
wage in dollars, and subtracts the old wage to obtain the predicted wage change in
dollars. See Appendix A.6 for results for alternative transformations.
Overall, the model is able to match the relative diﬀerences across workers, but
predicts too large a response in the reservation wages of low-skilled workers. As a
result, the model-generated drop in mismatch (and therefore the increase in wage)
is too large, and the fall in the unemployment rate is too small relative to the data.
Since low-skilled workers make up the largest share of unemployment, the drop in
the aggregate unemployment rate is also smaller. This is likely because the contact
rate was not the only aspect of the labor market that changed during the recovery.
For instance, the additional drop in the unemployment rate could be explained by a
change in the separation rate or a change in labor productivity. In either case, the
increase in market tightness is able to generate heterogeneous responses across worker
types that explain a substantial portion of the changes in outcomes observed during
the recovery.

1.5

On-the-job Search
This section extends the baseline model to allow employed workers to search on

the job (OTJ). Let λu and λe be the arrival rates of job oﬀers to unemployed and
employed workers, respectively. The continuation value of employment for a type
x worker employed by a type y ﬁrm now includes the value of on-the-job search,
(1 − s)λe φ(x, w).
Z

w

φ(x, w) =

max{E(x, w), E(x, w0 )} dG(w0 |x)

w
0

A new job (wage) oﬀer w will be accepted if and only if it provides a weakly greater
value of employment than the current job, ie. E(x, w0 ) ≥ E(x, w). Hence, the reservation wage for an employed worker is equal to the current wage, w. The reservation
∗
∗
wage for an unemployed worker is given by wOT
J such that E(x, wOT J (x)) = U (x).
∗
∗
wOT
J (x) = rU (x) − (1 − s)λe (φ(x, w (x) − U (x)))
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Because unemployed workers do not entirely give up the value of continued search
when accepting a job oﬀer, the opportunity cost of accepting a bad match falls relative
to the economy without on-the-job search. Increasing the eﬀectiveness (equivalently,
the arrival rate) of on-the-job search decreases workers’ reservation wages. Integrating
by parts, the reservation wage reduces to:
∗
wOT
J (x)

λu − (1 − s)λe
= b(x) +
r + s + (1 − s)λe

Z

w
∗
wOT
J (x)

e(w|x) dw
1−G

(1.16)

Note that while this has the same general form as the reservation wage in the economy without OTJ search, the new lower limit of integration makes an analytical
comparison impossible.
Since workers are able to change jobs, the reservation wage is no longer suﬃcient
to determine the relationship between the oﬀer arrival rate and average match quality.
To solve for the expected level of mismatch, the distribution of skill mismatch within
each type x must be in steady state. This requires either the distribution of matches
or the distribution of wages to be constant over time for each x. It is more general to
impose a steady-state assumption on the wage distribution. Following Burdett and
Mortensen [1998], the additional equilibrium condition is
∀x:

dHxOT J (w)
=0
dt

(1.17)

where HxOT J is the CDF of wages for employed workers of type x. Its time derivative,
representing the ﬂow of type x workers into jobs paying less than or equal to w, is
given by:
dHxOT J (w)(1 − u(x))
= u(x)λu
dt

Z

w

1(x, w) dGe(w|x)

w

− (1 −

u(x))HxOT J (w)

h

i
e
s + λe (1 − G(w|x)) (1.18)

The ﬁrst term represents the ﬂow of unemployed workers receiving and accepting a
wage oﬀer of w or less, and the second term represents the ﬂow of workers currently
employed at a wage less than or equal to w who separate to unemployment or receive a
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wage oﬀer greater than w. The steady-state distribution of wages earned by employed
workers of type x is therefore
HxOT J (w) =

u(x)λu

Rw
w

1(x, w) dGe(w|x)

e(w|x)))
(1 − u(x))(s + λe (1 − G

(1.19)

Given the steady-state distribution of wages, the expected wage for a worker x is
given by
w

OT J

Z

w

(x) =

J
w hOT
(w) dw
x

w
J
where hOT
(w) =
x

dHxOT J (w)

is the pdf of the steady state distribution of wages.
h
i
R
e(w|x))) + λe w 1(x, w0 )g̃(w0 |x) dw0
(1 − u(x))u(x)λu g̃(w|x) 1(x, w) · (s + λe (1 − G
w
hxOT J (w) =
h
i2
e(w|x)))
(1 − u(x))(s + λe (1 − G
(1.20)
dw

Finally, the expected observed mismatch for a worker of type x can be obtained by
inverting the wage function.
µOT J (x) = wx−1 (wOT J (x))

(1.21)

As with the reservation wage, since 1(x, w) changes under OTJ search, it is not
possible to compare expected wages or expected mismatch in the two economies
analytically.
To determine whether match quality is greater under on-the-job search, we can
compare the steady state wage distributions between the two environments. However,
the distribution of wages (or mismatch) is not suﬃcient to determine a worker’s
expected match. To ﬁnd the expected match for each worker type, we must make
the stronger assumption that the distribution of matches for each worker type x is
in steady state. Let the distribution of occupational matches for a worker of type x
be given by MxOT J (y). As before, when this distribution is in steady state, the time
derivative of its cdf will be equal to 0.
dMxOT J (x)
=0
dt

(1.22)
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The change in the measure of occupation matches less than or equal to y is the
diﬀerence between the sum of new matches and job-to-job transitions from existing
matches with occupations above y, and the sum of separations to unemployment and
to better matches with occupations above y.
Z y
dMxOT J (y)(1 − u(x))
1(x, y 0 ) dG(y 0 )
= u(x)λu
dt
Z0 1

Z y
0
0
00
OT J 00
+ (1 − u(x))λe
g(y )
1[w(x, y ) > w(x, y )] dMx (y ) dy 0
0
y


Z 1
OT J
0
0
− (1 − u(x))Mx (y) s + λe
1[w(x, y ) > w(x, y)] dG(y ) (1.23)
y

Setting the above equal to 0, we can write the cdf of matches for worker type x as
MxOT J (y)



y

Z

= u(x)λu

1(x, y 0 ) dG(y 0 )

0
y

1



+(1 − u(x))λe
1[w(x, y ) > w(x, y )]
dG(y )
0
y



Z 1
0
0
(1 − u(x)) s + λe
1[w(x, y ) > w(x, y)] dG(y )
(1.24)
Z

Z

0

00

dMxOT J (y 00 )

0

y
J
The pdf mOT
(y) can be used to ﬁnd the expected occupational match for each worker
x

type.
How much better oﬀ are workers when they are able to search on-the-job? Workers’
utility is assumed to be linear in income, so the expected ﬂow utility of a type x worker
can be expressed as
ω(x) = u(x)b(x) + (1 − u(x))w(x)

(1.25)

and aggregate welfare is
Z
W=

1

ω(x) dL(x)

(1.26)

0

1.5.1

Calibration

The extended model contains one additional parameter, λe , which must be estimated jointly with λu and δ. GMM identiﬁcation requires a number of moments at
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least as great as the number of parameters to be estimated, so an additional moment is required. Let S(x) denote the rate of job switching among employed type x
workers, and S denote the average rate of job switching among all employed workers.
That is,
e
S(x) = λe (1 − G(w(x)|x))

(1.27)

and
1

Z
S=

S(x)dx

(1.28)

0

In the NLSY97 data from 2009 to 2013, 2.85% of individuals in the labor force start
a new job in any given month and 47.37% of these new matches are employmentto-employment transitions. Across all employed workers, the average probability of
changing jobs in a given month is S = 0.0147. The extended model is estimated using
GMM, matching the aggregate unemployment rate, the max-min wage diﬀerential,
and the job switching rate. Table ?? shows the model ﬁt to these moments, and
Table 1.5 gives the calibrated parameter values.

Table 1.5.: Calibrated parameter values under on-the-job search.
Parameter

Value

Target

b0

0

(Normalization)

b1

0.4

Beneﬁts Accuracy Measurement

r

0.001

3-month Treasury bill

s

0.0299

(Job duration)−1

λu

0.5285

u, D90,50 , S

λe

0.0340

u, D90,50 , S

δ

0.1407

u, D90,50 , S
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1.5.2

Results

Workers’ reservation wages are qualitatively unchanged from the baseline model.
The reservation wage increases with the worker’s skill type, and workers near the
middle of the skills space obtain the highest wages relative to their maximum possible
wage oﬀer.
Wages
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t-

oC: 095
.
0

~

;::::
O

0.9
-

Expected
Reservation

0.85 ~ - - ~ - - ~ - - ~ - - ~ - - ~
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
0
Worker Type

Fig. 1.15.: Reservation and expected wages under OTJ search, relative to those where
λe is set to zero.

Figure 1.15 shows that while reservation wages fall for all workers under OTJ
search, expected wages may increase or decrease. Since workers are able to switch
jobs, the continuation value of employment is higher under OTJ search. The increased
continuation value decreases the wage necessary to equate the value of employment
with that of unemployment, so reservation wages for all workers are lower when they
can search on-the-job. In the calibrated model, reservation wages fall by 4.96% on
average relative to the counterfactual economy with λe = 0. The decrease in the
reservation wage puts downward pressure on workers’ average wage, since more lowwage oﬀers are accepted. However, the opportunity to climb the wage ladder pulls
average wages up. The net eﬀect is mixed. Medium-skilled workers experience a slight
increase in their expected wage because the job-switching eﬀect outweighs that of the
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decreased reservation wage, while workers at the ends of the skill space experience a
decline.
Unemployment rates and expected unemployment duration across the worker skill
space follow a similar pattern to the economy without OTJ search. However, the drop
in reservation wages leads to a decrease in unemployment rates and durations for all
workers. The average unemployment rate falls from 8.87% in the economy without
OTJ search to 7.68% when OTJ search is introduced, and the average unemployment
duration falls by just over 2 weeks, from 13.1 to 11.0 weeks.
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Fig. 1.16.: Model predicted match acceptance and expected mismatch under on-thejob search.

Figure 1.16 plots the match acceptance sets and expected level of mismatch across
the worker skill space. The bounds on match acceptance are similar to the baseline
case, but sorting (given by the median job type match) is slightly stronger for higherskilled workers when they are able to search OTJ, as shown in Figure 1.17. However,
this is oﬀset by the drop in the reservation wage; expected mismatch rises among this
groups of workers. Workers near the middle of the skill space experience a decrease
in expected mismatch, while low-skill workers’ expected match quality falls.
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Fig. 1.17.: Model predicted expected match and mismatch under OTJ search, relative
to the case where λe = 0.

Finally, I calculate the welfare gain from on the job search using the simple welfare
function given in the previous section. Expected income increases for all workers, and
aggregate welfare increases by 0.55% relative to the economy without OTJ search.

1.5.3

Mismatch Over the Business Cycle

How does the average level of mismatch in the economy change over the business
cycle? Analysis using the baseline model shows that unemployed workers become
more selective when the job oﬀer arrival rate increases, so that average mismatch is
countercyclical. The counterfactual examples below show the change in reservation
wages, expected wages, and expected mismatch resulting from changes in λu , λe , and
from a simultaneous change in both arrival rates. The values are calibrated using the
change in unemployment and vacancy rates between 2009 to 2013. Table 1.6 shows
the values used for each example. During this expansion, λu increased by 54.7%, and
λe increased by 21.1%.
As in the baseline model, higher values of λu increase the value of unemployment
and therefore increasing reservation wages. This leads to higher expected wages and
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Table 1.6.: Counterfactual job oﬀer arrival rates.
Counterfactual

λu

λe

2009

.4284 .0299

Increase λu

.6627 .0299

Increase λe

.4284 .0362

2013

.6627 .0362

lower mismatch for those workers whose reservation wage is above their minimum
wage oﬀer.
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Fig. 1.18.: Reservation wage change under counterfactual oﬀer arrival rates.

A higher arrival rate of job oﬀers for employed workers increases the continuation
value of employment, decreasing workers’ reservation wages. The aﬀect on expected
wages and expected mismatch is mixed. Those whose reservation wages fall the most
experience a decline in their expected wage and an increase in expected mismatch,
while the opposite occurs for workers with smaller changes in the reservation wage.
When both arrival rates are changed simultaneously, the λu eﬀect dominates that
of λe . Reservation wages rise across the board, leading to an increase in expected
wages and a decrease in mismatch that is nearly identical to the eﬀect of λu . How-
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ever, workers whose match acceptance probability is equal to 1 in both the 2009 and
increased λu examples see an additional aﬀect from the change in λe .
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Fig. 1.19.: Changes in expected wages and mismatch under counterfactual oﬀer arrival
rates.

1.6

Conclusion
In this paper, I provide new evidence on the presence of cognitive skill mismatch in

the labor market, and construct a one-sided search model to explain workers’ strategies for the acceptance of skill mismatch. Using data from the NLSY97 and O*NET,
I document three stylized facts relating to skill heterogeneity and mismatch. First, I
show that higher-skilled workers are less likely to be unemployed, experience shorter
unemployment spells, and earn higher incomes. This comes as no surprise, and provides validation that the measure of worker skills used in this paper is capturing a
salient worker characteristic. Second, I show that wage dispersion is positively correlated with the worker’s skill type. This suggests that each type of worker can be
employed in a range of jobs, and that higher-skilled workers may be willing to match
with a wider range of occupations. Finally, I construct the match sets in the occupation skill space for each type of worker. I ﬁnd evidence for some degree of positive
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sorting, but matching is not perfect. Higher-skilled workers match with better jobs on
average, but also tolerate relatively more mismatch in order to exit unemployment.
This novel fact motivates the creation of a search model with heterogeneous workers,
in order to better understand the diﬀerences in worker strategies.
For the purpose of this paper, I focus only on the worker’s problem. Since workers do not internalize the eﬀects of their reservation wage strategies and mismatch
tolerance on the decisions of ﬁrms, the worker’s problem is suﬃcient to characterize
workers’ strategies and outcomes. In a follow up paper, I extend the model to a twosided search framework where ﬁrms choose how many and what type of vacancies to
post. Under a parameterization comparable to the one in the current paper and with
a production function that take the same shape as the wage function in the one-sided
model, the results on match sets and mismatch tolerance are qualitatively unchanged.
To understand the relationship between search frictions and skill mismatch tolerance, I augment the McCall [1970] model to allow for heterogeneity among both
workers and ﬁrms, as well as a match-speciﬁc productivity function that is decreasing
in the level of mismatch. Workers’ decisions are summarized by a reservation wage
that depends on the conditional distribution of wage oﬀers as well as the oﬀer arrival
rate, separation rate, and discount rate. This model addresses mismatch in a way
that models without heterogeneity or models with discrete types are unable to do.
Consistent with the empirical facts, the model predicts that higher-skilled workers
display in increased tolerance for mismatch. Comparing workers’ expected value of
employment to the value of unemployment sheds light on this counterintuitive ﬁnding;
more skilled workers face a larger disparity between the value of employment to that
of unemployment. This provides a strong incentive to quickly exit unemployment,
leading higher-skilled workers to be relatively less selective in accepting job oﬀers.
Although on-the-job search allows workers to move up the job ladder, it does not
alleviate skill mismatch. By increasing the continuation value of employment, on-thejob search reduces the reservation wage. The net result is improved sorting among
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some groups of workers, and improved employment rates (but more mismatch) among
others.
The model also reveals an important role for skill heterogeneity in the interpretation of aggregate statistics such as the economy-wide average wage. In a labor
market with skill heterogeneity, worker strategies vary systematically depending on
their skills. Therefore, when the labor market improves after a recession, the increase
in market tightness can lead to a decrease in the average wage despite the fact that
expected wages increase for all types of workers. This is due to a change in the composition of employment; lower-skilled workers exit unemployment at relatively higher
rates, shifting the distribution of employment toward those workers who earn lower
wages. This composition eﬀect is consistent with recent explanations for the slow
growth of average wages during the recovery from the Great Recession.
While the model in the current paper provides valuable insight into workers’ tolerance of skill mismatch and its eﬀect on aggregate labor market outcomes, it also
provides a framework in which to address further questions relating to skill heterogeneity and mismatch. A natural follow up is to ask how much mismatch workers
should optimally accept and whether there are policies that implement the optimal
allocation. Additionally, the empirical relationship between mismatch and job tenure
described in Section 2 suggests an important role for endogenous separation and onthe-job search. It may be the case that workers accept high levels of mismatch but
search on the job in order to ﬁnd a better match. However, it may also be that
workers’ job oﬀer distributions are not uniform. In particular, if each workers’ oﬀer
distribution is centered around his best match, workers may accept a wide range of
jobs while achieving a higher degree of sorting. Each of these modiﬁcations could
produce a higher degree of sorting, allowing the model to better match the data. Finally, the present model can be extended to allow for endogenous vacancy creation by
ﬁrms to address the role of worker heterogeneity and mismatch in ﬁrms’ job creation
decisions.
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2. TARGETED SEARCH IN LABOR MARKETS WITH
SKILL HETEROGENEITY
2.1

Introduction
Who meets whom in a frictional market with heterogeneous agents? While micro-

data can tell us who matches with whom, meetings that do not result in a match are
almost never observable to the researcher. Structural models of markets with frictions
must therefore include assumptions about the process by which agents meet. With
a few exceptions, search-and-matching models of the labor market typically assume
that agents employ either a random or a directed search strategy when searching for
a bilateral meeting. Under random search, the probability of meeting a speciﬁc type
of ﬁrm is independent of the ﬁrm’s characteristics (wage, productivity, skill requirements, etc.), and meetings are randomly drawn from the population of ﬁrms. On the
other hand, directed (or competitive) search models assume that workers can observe
ﬁrm characteristics prior to meeting and choose a ﬁrm type to meet without error.
However, both categories of models fail to generate some important characteristics
present in labor market data, implying that workers’ search strategies may be neither
perfectly random or directed.1
Random search models with heterogeneity generate some positive sorting, but
fall short in predicting the strength of sorting. Moreover, the distance between the
expected match predicted by random search models and the average match observed
in the data varies across worker types, suggesting that some types of workers search
more randomly than others. On the other hand, competitive search models cannot
1

In a current working paper, Lentz and Moen [2017] propose a model that nests both random and
competitive search in an eﬀort to estimate the degree to which search is directed. While the model is
promising, the estimation relies on the assumption that workers are identical and requires matched
employer-employee data.
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generate skill mismatch in an environment where mismatch is costly and wages are
positively correlated with productivity.
This paper explores an alternative search strategy known as targeted search in
the context of a labor market with a continuum of vertically diﬀerentiated workers
and jobs. When using a targeted search strategy, workers searching for employment
cannot perfectly observe a ﬁrm’s type before meeting, and so are unable to choose a
speciﬁc ﬁrm type to meet. However, they can expend costly search eﬀort to reduce the
probability of meeting undesirable jobs. Higher levels of search eﬀort lead to better
job oﬀer distributions, so by choosing a level of search eﬀort, workers control how
narrowly to target their search. Numerical examples indicate that targeted search
can improve the ﬁt of a search-and-matching model to U.S. labor market data on
sorting on cognitive skills relative to a random search assumption.
The process of targeted search can be thought of as obtaining some information
about a job prior to making contact. For example, an unemployed worker may spend
time reading job descriptions in online job ads before applying. In a labor market
with an inﬁnite variety of worker skills and job skill requirements, an afternoon spent
reading job ads will likely not lead to an error-free identiﬁcation of the worker’s ideal
job. However, it may deter him from contacting jobs for which he is obviously not
well suited. If he has only a high school degree, he may choose not to spend the
time and eﬀort applying to jobs which require a master’s degree. As a result, the
distribution of jobs that the worker contacts will diﬀer in a predictable way from
the global distribution of vacancies posted. The density of applications to relatively
well-matched jobs will rise, and the density of applications to very poor matches
will fall. In this example, the cost of search eﬀort may be the opportunity cost of
time spent on an activity other than leisure, a monetary cost associated with the job
search platform, a mental or emotional cost, or any combination of these. In any
case, increasing search eﬀort (either eﬀort per unit of time or time spent searching)
incurs an increased search cost but yields an improved job oﬀer distribution.
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2.1.1

Related Literature

Random search models are based on the assumption that agents are unable to
locate a speciﬁc partner on the other side of the market. Therefore, contact rates
between workers and ﬁrms in random search environments are independent of characteristics, and in equilibrium agents accept matches that are sub-optimal in comparison to the frictionless benchmark. Building on the one-sided random search model of
McCall [1970], Buhrmann [2018] models the match acceptance decisions of vertically
diﬀerentiated workers.2 I show that a random search model can predict the match
acceptance sets of diﬀerent types of workers, and generates positive sorting on cognitive skills. However, the strength of sorting predicted by the model is less than what
is observed in the data. The current paper extends this earlier model by endogenizing
the degree of randomness with which workers search for jobs.
In contrast with random search, directed search assumes that agents can identify
and meet a chosen partner. Introduced by Moen [1997], competitive search environments feature wage posting (with commitment) by ﬁrms with directed search by
identical workers. Firms separate into submarkets according to the posted wage, and
workers choose one submarket (wage) to search in3 . The relative mass of ﬁrms and
workers in each submarket determines the contact rate, and workers consider both
the wage and the expected duration of unemployment when choosing a submarket
to search in. In equilibrium, workers are indiﬀerent across all submarkets, leading to
wage dispersion among identical workers. However, this model is inconsistent with
the existence of skill mismatch in an environment with productive complementarity
between worker and ﬁrm skills.4 Shi [2002] studies a competitive search model with
skilled and unskilled workers, but the unique equilibrium does not feature skill mis2

See Marimon and Zilibotti [1999] for an example without vertical diﬀerentiation; Shimer and Smith
[2000], Shimer and Smith [2001] for a model with vertical diﬀerentiation in marriage markets; Teulings and Gautier [2004] for a model with product diﬀerentiation.
3
In a goods market model, Yang [2013] introduces error into the choice of sumbarket, calling it
“targeted” search. While the model features buyers with heterogeneous preferences, it cannot address
the question of sorting in a labor market.
4
See Appendix B.1 for discussion of this statement.
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match. In an equivalent environment, Shimer [2005c] generalizes the model to include
continuous worker and ﬁrm heterogeneity.5 The model generates skill mismatch in
equilibrium, but fails to predict a positive correlation between worker productivity
and wages.
To address these and other shortcomings of random and directed search strategies,
the literature has proposed a variety of intermediate search strategies.6 In a goods
market setting, Lester [2011] proposes a model where buyers have heterogeneous information about prices before meeting a seller. Informed buyers direct their search to
low-price sellers, while uninformed buyers choose at random, leading to price dispersion in equilibrium. A working paper by Godøy and Moen [2013] presents a related
model in a labor market setting, labeling this search strategy “mixed search”. In their
model, all workers search using both random and directed strategies simultaneously.
The model generates realistic patterns of wage changes at job-to-job transitions, but
assumes that workers are identical and therefore cannot be used to address sorting
on skills.
Decreuse [2008] describes a “choosy search” strategy in a model based on Marimon
and Zilibotti [1999], which allows for worker and ﬁrm types distributed on the unit
circle with costly mismatch. However, Decreuse assumes that the market is segmented
by job type. Rather than receiving a job oﬀer at random from the population of
vacancies, workers choose a range of job types to apply to. Workers apply to multiple
submarkets at the same time, and solving the model requires that workers apply to
all job types with a positive match surplus.7 While this model has the advantage of
being able to quantify the congestion eﬀects caused by workers searching too widely,
the equilibrium match sets are equivalent to those of the random search model in
Marimon and Zilibotti [1999].
5

See Eeckhout and Kircher [2010] for a discussion of conditions required for assortative matching in
a related buyer-seller model.
6
Menzio [2007] constructs a competitive search model with ﬁrm productivity heterogeneity and lack
of commitment in wage posting that he labels “partially directed” search, but the model cannot
address mismatch since workers are assumed to be identical.
7
Due to the assumption of continuous time, neither workers or ﬁrms receive simultaneous contacts.
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The model of Gavrel et al. [2012] provides another variation on the horizontal
diﬀerentiation model of Marimon and Zilibotti [1999]. The authors propose an environment in which search is “oriented” around a worker’s preferred ﬁrm type. Workers
search randomly in a subset of the ﬁrm type space, and each worker meets one ﬁrm
within a ﬁxed, exogenous distance from his own skill type. Firms may receive multiple applications at once, and always hire the best-matched worker. All matches
are assumed to be acceptable, so there is no role for a match acceptance decision by
either the worker or the ﬁrm. Instead, the authors focus on the decision of ﬁrms to
provide on-the-job training to reduce mismatch after hiring.
The model most closely related to that of the current paper is Cheremukhin et al.
[2016]. The authors propose a search strategy called “targeted search” in which agents
choose a probability distribution over potential meetings. The new search strategy is
discussed in the context of a marriage market; there are F types of females and M
types of males each searching for a match. With some assumptions on preferences
and on the surplus created by matches, the model can be used to investigate sorting.
Search costs increase as the chosen probability distribution changes away from that
of the population (as measured by the Kullback-Leibler divergence), and the model
is designed to understand the trade-oﬀ between a expected payoﬀ and search costs.
As expected, higher probabilities are placed on matches with higher payoﬀs; this is
referred to as the productive motive. However, since the model is designed to address
the marriage market, a key feature is the strategic importance of best responding to
the agents on the opposite side of the market. Preferences of males and females may
not coincide such that one’s preferred type would agree to match. Therefore, the
probability distributions chosen by males play a large role in determining the optimal
strategies (probability distributions) of females and vice versa. In a labor market
environment where skill types are complements in production, workers and ﬁrms will
always agree on whether a match is acceptable and the so-called strategic motive is
not relevant.
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2.2

Model
In this section, I construct a search-and-matching model that extends the theory of

targeted search to a labor market setting with a continuum of vertically diﬀerentiated
agents. The model nests both random and directed search as special cases, and allows
each type of worker to choose the degree of randomness of his search. I build on
the one-sided search framework of Buhrmann (2018) by incorporating an additional
decision problem in which workers choose how narrowly to target their search. In the
one-sided random search environment, a worker’s reservation wage depends on the
distribution of wage oﬀers she expects to receive. In typical random search models,
this distribution is determined only by the distribution of vacant jobs. However,
targeted search gives workers the option to pay an information cost to improve the
oﬀer distribution.
The objective of this paper is to construct and estimate a model of targeted
search in the labor market, to determine whether the generalized search process can
improve the ﬁt of the one-sided search model. In the model, workers are risk-neutral
and inﬁnitely-lived, discount the future at rate r, and maximize expected discounted
utility which is linear in income. A worker can be either employed or unemployed
at any time. All unemployed workers search for jobs, and there is no on-the-job
search. An employed worker remains in his job until it is terminated, which occurs
at a Poisson rate s. In this environment, a ﬁrm corresponds to one vacant job.
Heterogeneity. Workers are heterogeneous in skills, indexed by type x ∈ [0, 1],
such that higher x indicates a more skilled worker. While unemployed, workers receive
a ﬂow beneﬁt b(x). Firms are also heterogeneous, indexed by skill type y ∈ [0, 1].
Worker skill types x and skill requirements of vacant jobs y are distributed according
to cdf’s L and G, with corresponding pdf’s `(x) and g(y). The distributions of
unemployed and employed workers depend on the workers’ decision problem, and are
not necessarily equal to L; call these distributions F and Fe, respectively. The ﬁrm
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distribution G includes only vacant ﬁrms, and the distribution of vacancies is assumed
to be invariant to worker behavior.
Skill Mismatch. Skill mismatch, deﬁned as the diﬀerence between a worker’s skill
and the skill requirement of his occupation, is costly. Empirical literature shows that
workers who are mismatched earn lower wages than those who are well-matched. Let
the wage earned by worker x when employed by ﬁrm y be given by w(x, y). Deﬁne
µ = |x − y| as the skill mismatch of the pair. The wage function must satisfy the
following properties:
1. w(x, y) ≥ 0 ∀(x, y)
2. Given x = x0 , w(x0 , y) quasiconcave in y
3. wx > 0
Condition (1) simply imposes a minimum wage of 0. Convexity of match sets is
ensured by (2); that is, if x is willing to accept jobs y1 and y2 , they should also
accept all y ∈ (y1 , y2 ). Condition (3) ensures that higher-skilled workers have higher
earning potential. Because skill mismatch is costly, a lower level of skill mismatch is
always preferred. However, because job search is also costly, workers must trade oﬀ
between lower mismatch (higher wages) and a higher employment rate. Condition
(4) is necessary to ensure that the
Job Search. All unemployed workers receive job oﬀers at a Poisson rate. Workers
know the distribution of potential job oﬀers (vacancies), but are unable to locate a
speciﬁed job type with certainty. Oﬀers arrive from a distribution Ψx,η (y) with pdf
ψx,η (y), which depends on the worker’s type x and his choice of search eﬀort η. The
baseline case, η = 0, corresponds to random search, so that the weighting function
is constant across all y. In this case, the oﬀer distribution is equal to the underlying
vacancy distribution:
ψx,0 (y) = g(y)
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For search eﬀort η > 0, increased eﬀort corresponds to a more concentrated job oﬀer
distribution. However, as it is not possible to receive oﬀers from job types with no
vacancies, the oﬀer distribution must be a re-weighting of the vacancy distribution.
Let φx,η be the weighting function. The realized oﬀer distribution is:
ψx,η (y) = R

φx,η (y)g(y)
.
φx,η (y)g(y) dy

(2.1)

For any weighting function such that φx,η (y) is positive and ﬁnite for all y, the cdf of
the oﬀer distribution, Ψx,η , is a valid distribution.
In an environment with costly skill mismatch, workers prefer to match with jobs
close to their own skill type, so the weighting function must be (weakly) decreasing
in the level of skill mismatch. If search eﬀort is greater than 0, the weighting function
should be symmetric and unimodal, peaking at y = x. Finally, the weighting function
must be able to be expressed in closed-form in terms of two parameters, x and η.
For example, the linear weighting function φx,η (y) = x − η|x − y| implies that the
probability of contacting job y decreases linearly in skill mismatch, conditional on
the underlying distribution of vacancies. On the other hand, if mismatch becomes
more costly as the distance between x and y increases, it may be more relevant to
(y−x)2

use a weighting function with curvature. For example, φx,η (y) =

−
1√
e 2σ(η)2
σ(η) 2π

uses

the search eﬀort η to control the standard deviation of the weighting function. When
σ 0 (η) < 0, increasing search eﬀort decreases the variance of the oﬀer distribution and
increases the probability of meeting a good match. Figure 2.1 shows oﬀer distributions
for several example cases, for worker type x = 0.75.
Increasing η can be thought of as obtaining information about a job prior to
applying. Rather than calling every business with a help wanted ad, a worker may
take some time to read the job ad, explore the ﬁrm’s website, and evaluate the possible
match. Let c(η) be the cost of choosing search eﬀort η, satisfying:
1. c(0) = 0
2. c0 (η) ≥ 0
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Fig. 2.1.: Oﬀer distributions under diﬀerent weighting functions, for x = 0.75.

In addition, decreasing the range of jobs to call may decrease the worker’s contact
rate. Let λ0 be the contact rate of a worker choosing to search randomly. Then the
contact rate for a worker choosing search eﬀort η is λ(η), where:
1. λ(η) ≤ λ0 ∀ η > 0
2. λ0 (η) ≤ 0
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The contact rate cannot be greater than that of a randomly searching worker, and
must be weakly decreasing in the worker’s choice of search eﬀort.

2.2.1

Equilibrium

The equilibrium strategy for a worker of type x is to choose a search eﬀort η and a
reservation wage w∗ such that a job oﬀering wage w is accepted if and only if w ≥ w∗ ,
and η maximizes the worker’s value of unemployment.
Value Functions. A job is deﬁned by its ﬁrm type y, but because utility depends
only on income a job can fully summarized by the wage it pays, conditional on the
worker’s type x. Deﬁne U (x) as the value of unemployment for a type x worker and
E(x, w) as the value of employment for a type x worker at a job paying wage w.
The worker’s continuation value is equal to either U (x) if the job is terminated and
E(x, y) otherwise.
E(x, w) =

w + sU (x)
r+s

(2.2)

An unemployed worker receives ﬂow beneﬁts b(x), and chooses η to maximize
his continuation value net of search costs. To target his search, the worker must
pay ﬂow cost c(η). He then receives wage oﬀers at a Poisson rate λ(η) from the
e x,η (w|x). The wage oﬀer distribution is a direct transformation
oﬀer distribution Ψ
e x,η (w|x) =
of the job oﬀer distribution Ψx,η (y). If the wage function is invertible, Ψ
Ψx,η (w−1 (w|x)). However, w(x, y) may be a many-to-one function of y, so w−1 (w|x)
may be a relation rather than a function. Because the wage function is quasiconcave
in y, the relation w−1 (w|x) will assign at most two y values for each w. In this case,
e x,η (w|x) = Ψx,η (max{w−1 (w|x)}) − Ψx,η (min{w−1 (w|x)}). An oﬀer is accepted if
Ψ
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and only if E(x, w) ≥ U (x). The model does not allow for borrowing or saving, so a
worker may not spend more on searching than is received in unemployment beneﬁts.


1
U (x) =
b(x) + max − c(η) + (1 − λ(η))U (x)
η≥0
1+r

Z
e
+λ(η) max {E(x, w), U (x)} ψx,α (w|x) dw
s.t. b(x) − c(η) ≥ 0
Deﬁne the optimal search eﬀort η ∗ (x) as that which maximizes the worker’s value
of unemployment subject to the budget constraint. Denote the maximized value of
unemployment as U ∗ (x). The maximized ﬂow value of unemployment can then be
written as
λ(η ∗ (x))
rU (x) = b(x)−c(η (x))+
r+s
∗

∗

Z
max{E(x, w)−U (x), 0}ψex,η∗ (x) (w|x) dw (2.3)

Reservation Wage. Upon receiving a job oﬀer, a worker will accept the match if
and only if the present value, E(x, w), is greater than that of remaining unemployed,
U (x). Since utility depends only on income, this induces a reservation wage strategy
where a type x worker will accept all jobs oﬀering a wage greater than w∗ (x) and reject
those with insuﬃcient wage oﬀers. The reservation wage w∗ (x) is the wage at which
the worker is indiﬀerent between employment and unemployment, or E(x, w∗ (x)) =
U ∗ (x).
w∗ (x) − rU ∗ (x)
=0
E(x, w (x)) − U (x) =
r+s
∗

∗

Hence, the reservation wage is equal to the worker’s ﬂow value of unemployment,
rU ∗ (x), and is a function of the worker’s optimal choice of search eﬀort η ∗ (x).
Z
λ(η ∗ (x))
∗
∗
max {w − w∗ (x), 0} ψex,η∗ (x) (w|x) dw
w (x) = b(x) − c(η (x)) +
r+s
Using integration by parts, the reservation wage can be rewritten as:
Z
λ(η ∗ (x)) w
∗
∗
e x,η∗ (x) (w|x) dw
1−Ψ
w (x) = b(x) − c(η (x)) +
r+s
w∗ (x)

(2.4)
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Search Eﬀort. After deﬁning the reservation wage, we can make use of the same
integration by parts to deﬁne the optimal search eﬀort more concisely. Search eﬀort
is chosen simultaneously with the reservation wage, so the optimal choice of search
eﬀort η ∗ (x) is given by:
λ(η)
η (x) = arg max −c(η) +
r+s
η≥0
∗

Z

w
w∗ (x)

e x,η (w|x) dw
1−Ψ

(2.5)

s.t. b(x) − c(η) ≥ 0
When the budget constraint is non-binding, workers target their search more intensely
when it is less costly to do so in terms of either c0 (η) or λ0 (η). Lower c0 (η) reduces the
current utility cost of increasing search eﬀort. Recall that λ0 (η) ≤ 0, so higher λ0 (η)
implies fewer foregone oﬀers relative to the random search benchmark. Additionally,
equilibrium search eﬀort is higher under weighting functions that are more eﬃcient at
reducing the likelihood of low wage oﬀers. Speciﬁcally, workers target more intensely
Rw
e
when the average change in the probability of low wage oﬀers, w∗ (x) dΨx,ηdη(w|x) dw, is
larger.

2.3

Numerical Example
In this section, I provide a numerical example to illustrate the equilibrium out-

come. Workers and vacancies are uniformly distributed across the unit interval;
L(x) = G(y) = U (0, 1). When unemployed, workers receive beneﬁts that increase
in skill level. In particular, beneﬁts are assumed to be proportional to workers’ wage
at the best matched occupation.
b(x) = b · w(x, x)
This captures the fact that higher-skilled workers have a higher outside option, while
abstracting from the history-dependent UI policies that are in place today. As in
Buhrmann (2018), wages depend on the skill type of the worker as well as the occupa-
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tion, are increasing in worker skill, and are decreasing in skill mismatch. Speciﬁcally,
wages take the form
w(x, y) = x − δ(x − y)2

(2.6)

where δ is a skill complementarity parameter describing how important skill mismatch
is in determining workers’ wages.
In addition to those functions already listed, the current model requires assumptions on the cost of search eﬀort, how search eﬀort aﬀects the oﬀer arrival rate, and
on the weighting function. To provide a computational illustration of the equilibrium
and comparative statics of this model, I use the following functions. The utility cost
of search eﬀort must be weakly increasing, and must be continuous at η = 0. It is
costless to search randomly, expending zero search eﬀort, so I require limη→0 c(η) = 0.
To reﬂect the idea that the primary cost of search eﬀort is the time associated, I set
search costs proportional to the ﬂow value of leisure time. The parameter α1 is added
to allow for some nonlinearity in the cost of search eﬀort.
c(η) = c0 · b(x) · η α1
The weighting function φx,η is assumed to be normally distributed with mean x and
standard deviation σ(η).
φx,η (y) =

(y−x)2
1
−
√ e 2(1/σ(η))2
σ(η) 2π

The standard deviation of φx,η should be decreasing in search eﬀort. It must also
satisfy limη→0 σ(η) = ∞, so that the search strategy converges to random as search
eﬀort approaches 0. This ensures that limη→0 ψx,η (y) = g(y), and the unemployed
worker’s value function is continuous at η = 0. I include a scalar multiplier on search
eﬀort, α2 , so that small values of η can produce a substantial improvement in the
variance of job oﬀers. This parameter represents the eﬃciency of search eﬀort in
reﬁning the job oﬀer distribution.
σ(η) =

1
α2 η

62
The job oﬀer arrival rate may be weakly decreasing in search eﬀort, with a maximum
at λ0 , the oﬀer arrival rate under random search. To maintain continuity of the
value function, limη→0 λ(η) = λ0 . I allow the arrival rate to be nonlinear in η with
a parameter α3 , so that the marginal cost of search eﬀort in terms of expected job
oﬀers may vary.

λ(η) = min

2.3.1

λ0
, λ0
(1 + η)α3



Calibration

I use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) 1997 for the
time period 2009-2013 to calculate several of the model parameters. At this time,
survey respondents are between 25-33 years old. The model is calibrated at monthly
frequency.

Table 2.1.: Calibrated parameter values
Parameter

Value

Target

b1

0.4

Beneﬁts Accuracy Measurement

r

0.001

3-month Treasury bill

s

0.0299

(Job duration)−1

λ0

0.5010

Buhrmann (2018)

δ

0.1003

Buhrmann (2018)

The monthly interest rate r is chosen to match the average 3-month treasury
bill rate from 2009-2013. The U.S. Department of Labor’s Oﬃce of Unemployment
Insurance releases a yearly Beneﬁt Accuracy Measurement report containing each
state’s quarterly UI replacement rate. From 2009 to 2013, the weighted average U.S.
replacement rate was between 0.405 and 0.470. To provide conservative estimates
of the remaining parameters, b1 = 0.4. The other parameters are calibrated using
data from the NLSY97. The average reported job tenure is 33.50 months, leading

63
to a separation rate of s = 0.0299. The oﬀer arrival rate λ0 and the wage loss
due to mismatch δ are jointly estimated using GMM in the random-search model of
Buhrmann (2018).

8

Parameters that have not yet been calibrated are the elasticities on search eﬀort,
α1 , α2 , and α3 , and the scalar cost parameter c0 . For the purpose of this example,
I set c0 = 0.1, α1 = 4, α2 = 2, and α3 = 0. This parameterization implies that the
marginal utility cost of search eﬀort is increasing; at these values, low levels of search
eﬀort are very inexpensive, but high search eﬀort becomes prohibitively costly. For
simplicity, the oﬀer arrival rate is currently assumed to be constant with respect to
search eﬀort.

2.3.2

Results

In this example, all workers choose search eﬀort strictly below the maximum and
above zero, and obtain a job oﬀer distribution with a standard deviation at or below
1. Because the cost of search eﬀort is proportional to the worker’s unemployment
beneﬁt, the maximum level of search eﬀort (determined by the budget constraint) is
the same for all workers. Figure 2.2 plots the optimal choice of search eﬀort for workers
of each skill level, as well as the resulting job oﬀer distribution. Mid-skill workers,
whose expected match under random search is close to their best match, expend the
least amount of search eﬀort. For these workers, increased targeting reduces average
mismatch but does not signiﬁcantly change the expected job type match. However,
high- and low-skill workers have more to gain by targeting search, and accordingly
expend more search eﬀort.
The realized job oﬀer distribution reﬂects workers’ choice of search eﬀort. Lowand high-skill workers obtain narrower oﬀer distributions than workers near the middle of the skill space. Because the underlying job distribution is uniform, the shape of
the composite distribution reﬂects that of the weighting function. Since the weight8

See the appendix for a discussion of constructing worker and occupation skill measures.
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Fig. 2.2.: Optimal choice of search eﬀort, and resulting job oﬀer distribution.

ing function in this example is normal, each worker’s oﬀer distribution is a truncated
normal distribution that peaks at the occupation corresponding to his own skill type.
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Even when search is targeted, workers may meet jobs with skill requirements
far from their ideal match. In this example, the highest-skilled workers may still
encounter jobs with the lowest skill requirements, though the probability of such a
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meeting is low relative to better matches. Workers’ decision strategy is represented
by a reservation wage that determines the range of occupations with which they
are willing to match. Optimal match acceptance sets are plotted in Figure 2.3. As
in the random search case, bounds on match acceptance are relatively wide; the
average probability of accepting a match conditional on meeting is 83.6%. As a
result, the unemployment rate in this example falls to 6.84%. The random search
example discussed in Buhrmann (2018) resulted in an acceptance rate of 75.6%, with
a corresponding unemployment rate of 8.24%.
However, workers are slightly more selective under targeted search. Reservation
wages are higher than in the random search case, causing the maximum level of mismatch tolerance to fall and match acceptance ranges to narrow for all workers. While
mismatch is still widespread, the average level of expected mismatch across all worker
skill types is 0.1976, a 12.14% improvement over random search. The correlation between a worker’s skill type and his expected occupation match is increased; in other
words, targeted search improves sorting.

2.3.3

Comparison with U.S. labor market data

The primary data source in this paper is the NLSY97. Conducted by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics, this nationally representative survey samples individuals born
between 1980-1984. I restrict the analysis to the 2009-2013 waves of the survey;
during this time period, respondents are 25-33 years old. To account for selective
attrition, I use custom sample weights calculated over the subsample of individuals
who appear in any wave between 2009-2013. Appendix A.3 discusses sample selection
criteria and descriptive statistics for the relevant subsample. I obtain information
on occupational skill requirements from O*NET, which provides information on 704
SOC-level occupations, and rank occupations based on the “level” requirement for a
subset of cognitive skills9 .
9

For each occupation in O*NET, a “level” and an “importance” score are provided for each of 277
descriptors. The level score assigned to a skill indicates the degree of competency in that skill
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As in the model, skill mismatch is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between a worker’s
skill type x and the skill type y of the occupation in which the worker is employed.
To measure skill mismatch between a worker-occupation pair, it is necessary to assign skill types to both parties. The construction of individual and occupation skill
rankings is described in more detail in Buhrmann [2018]; I summarize the empirical
methodology here. To rank individuals in the NLSY97 on the basis of cognitive skills,
I use principal components analysis (PCA) to combine information on cognitive test
scores from the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) test and educational attainment.10 This method returns a ranking over individuals such that,
conditional on education level, an individual with a higher ASVAB rank is assigned a
higher skill type.11 Occupational skill rankings are computed using PCA to combine
information on two cognitive skill descriptors, “Judgment and Decision Making” and
“Complex Problem Solving”, and weighting by occupational employment shares.12
Figure 2.4 plots the kernel density of occupation skill type matches observed in the
NLSY97 data for representative worker skill types. The match densities are clearly
not uniform, indicating that workers meet some types of jobs more often than others.
This alone strongly suggests that job search is not random. In addition, match
densities are roughly single-peaked near the worker’s best match, indicating that the
probability of meeting a speciﬁc job falls as the level of mismatch increases. Both
of these characteristics suggest that targeted search may provide an improvement on
the model’s ability to match the data.
To determine whether targeted search can actually improve the ﬁt of the model,
I compute the Kullback-Leibler divergence of the predicted match density of each of
needed to succeed at the occupation; the importance score describes how essential the skill is to the
occupation.
10
The ASVAB consists of 12 component sections, over skills both abstract and practical. Four categories, mathematics knowledge, arithmetic reasoning, paragraph comprehension, and word knowledge, are considered “cognitive”.
11
Including education level in the construction of worker skills is a divergence from recent empirical literature that increases the correlation between worker skill and wage and decreases average
mismatch.
12
The analysis is robust to other methods of ranking, see the data appendix of Buhrmann [2018] for
a full discussion.

67

Fig. 2.4.: Density of matches by worker skill type.
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the models from the empirical density. Because of the size of the dataset, I divide the
skill space into 20 bins of size 0.05 and construct an empirical match density for each
skill bin.13 On average, each bin contains data on 271.4 worker-occupation matches.
For each of the 20 bins, I calculate the divergence of each model predicted density
from the empirical density as
KLjn

=

X
y

Mnj (y) log



Mnj (y)
Mndata (y)



where n indicates the skill bin, j indicates the model (targeted or random), Mnj (y) is
the model-generated expected match density over occupations for workers in bin n.
Lower values mean that the model-predicted density is less distant from the empirical
density. For a skill bin n, the improvement (or lack thereof) of targeted search
relative to random search is KLtargeted
/KLnrandom . To quantify the improvement of
n
the targeted search model relative to random search, I average this ratio of across all
skill bins.
1 X KLtargeted
n
20 n KLrandom
n
In the current example, targeted search provides a 7.8% improvement over random
search. Since the model parameters were not re-estimated under targeted search,
this is only an illustration of the improvement that targeted search can provide.
13

The result is robust to a bin size of 0.01 as well, but at this level of granularity the empirical
density functions are much more noisy.
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Estimating or calibrating the new parameters c0 , α1 , α2 , α3 will yield a more accurate
estimate of the actual improvement provided by allowing workers to target their
search. However, the parameters of the random search model used for comparison
here was estimated using GMM to obtain the best possible ﬁt. Though it is an
uncalibrated example, the targeted search model is shown to provide a better ﬁt.

2.4

Conclusion
This paper proposes an application of the targeted search strategy introduced by

Cheremukhin et al. [2016] to a labor market where agents are continuously vertically
diﬀerentiated in skills. Targeted search is a generalization of random search where
bilateral meetings occur randomly, but the distribution from which meetings are
drawn depends on the agent’s type. In particular, in this model focusing on the
workers’ decision problem, workers have the ability to reduce the variance of the
job oﬀer distribution by expending search eﬀort. However, targeting one’s search
incurs a cost; workers choose an optimal level of search eﬀort to balance the gains
from improved matching with the utility cost of search eﬀort. The result is a job
oﬀer distribution that is systematically diﬀerent from the underlying distribution of
vacancies in the economy.
In a numerical example, targeted search is shown to generate mismatch tolerance
strategies that are qualitatively similar to the equilibrium under random search. However, workers have an additional choice variable at their disposal in the current model:
search eﬀort. The optimal level of search eﬀort varies with workers’ skill type. Highand low-skilled workers, whose expected match under random search is furthest from
the wage-maximizing match, choose higher levels of search eﬀort in order to obtain
narrower job oﬀer distributions. Workers near the middle of the skill space, whose
expected mismatch under random search is lower, choose lower levels of search eﬀort
in equilibrium.
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Compared to random search, targeted search provides an improvement in the ﬁt
of the model to the data on match densities and sorting. The biggest improvement
is among higher-skilled workers, where random search clearly failed to produce the
strength of positive sorting observed in the data. When averaged across all worker
skill groups, the uncalibrated targeted search example discussed here ﬁts the data on
match densities 7.8% better than the random search model estimated using GMM,
illustrating the potential of targeted search models to help researchers better understand the imperfect but positive sorting on skills that arises in the labor market.
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3. SKILL MISMATCH AND THE EQUILIBRIUM
DISTRIBUTION OF VACANCIES
3.1

Introduction
When the Great Recession oﬃcially ended in June 2009, the U.S. unemployment

rate was at 9.5%; after peaking in October 2009, unemployment began to fall before ﬁnally reaching pre-recession levels in late 2015. During this time, the job vacancy rate started to increase and the economy moved upward along the Beveridge
Curve. However, decreases in the unemployment rate fell behind the increasing vacancy rate, so that a given vacancy rate corresponded to a higher unemployment
rate post-recession. This apparent outward shift in the Beveridge Curve suggests
that the aggregate vacancy and unemployment rates are not suﬃcient statistics for
understanding the status of a labor market. Job ﬁnding rates, expected duration
of vacancies, expected match quality, and even wages depend on the distributions of
unemployed workers and vacant jobs. How do these distributions arise? In particular,
how does the vacancy creation decision respond to the distribution of skills oﬀered
by workers?
This paper seeks to understand how skill heterogeneity and mismatch aﬀect occupational vacancy rates and match distributions. Using the Diamond [1982], Mortensen
[1982], Pissarides [1985] (DMP) framework of time-consuming search by workers and
ﬁrms, the paper develops a model with costly skill mismatch and endogenous job
creation. Workers and jobs are heterogeneous and vertically diﬀerentiated in skills.
Pair-speciﬁc skill mismatch is deﬁned as the distance between a worker’s skill type and
that of the job in which he is employed. Unemployed workers and ﬁrms with vacant
jobs search for a match; upon meeting, the worker and ﬁrm jointly decide whether
to accept the match or to continue searching. A worker’s skill type is ﬁxed when he
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enters the labor market, but a ﬁrm is able to choose the skill type of any vacancy
it opens. Solving the model computationally, I obtain the equilibrium distribution
of vacancies across the skill space. The model generates new predictions regarding
the response of the vacancy distribution to the distribution of skills oﬀered by unemployed workers, as well as to labor market parameters such as bargaining power
and matching elasticity. Skill mismatch also plays an important role in shaping the
vacancy distribution. Higher levels of expected mismatch reduce the expected value
of a vacancy, suppressing vacancy creation.
The model is calibrated to match U.S. labor market data from 2009 to 2013. The
calibrated model yields the equilibrium unemployment rates for each type of worker,
vacancy rates for each type of job, and the wage for each worker-job pair. Results
show a nonlinear relationship between skill level and mismatch tolerance; like the
one-sided model in Buhrmann [2018], highly productive workers and ﬁrms accept
relatively more mismatch than those near the middle of the skill distribution. The
distribution of vacancies generated by the model is non-uniform. Very few jobs are
created a low-skilled occupations, despite the supply of low-skill unemployed workers.
The vacancy rate is highest among mid-skill occupations near the skill type of the
median unemployed worker, because workers of almost all skill types can proﬁtably
match with these jobs and the probability of an acceptable match is high. Despite the
relatively low numbers of high-skill unemployed workers, jobs in high-skill occupations
continue to be created due to the proﬁtability of a good match.
Skill mismatch is shown to be counter-cyclical. Intuitively, workers and ﬁrms
tolerate less mismatch when the labor market improves. Comparing the equilibrium
outcome between 2009 to 2013, this is exactly what occurs. Like in Buhrmann [2018],
all workers become more selective in matching, with high-skilled workers responding
more strongly to changes in labor market conditions. The corresponding improvement
in expected match quality for high-skilled jobs leads to a shift toward higher-skilled
occupations in the vacancy distribution.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model
and deﬁnes the equilibrium. Section 3 discusses the calibrated numerical example,
illustrates the eﬀect of a change in the underlying distribution of workers, and plots
comparative statics. Section 4 concludes.

3.1.1

Related Literature

One of the earliest papers to explore the relationship between skill mismatch and
job creation is Acemoglu [1999]. In a model with two types of workers, skilled and
unskilled, the paper shows that the composition of jobs is key in determining wages,
inequality, and unemployment rates, and that the composition of workers strongly
inﬂuences the distribution of jobs. In a related model, Albrecht and Vroman [2002]
generate skill mismatch by assuming that unskilled workers are only able to perform
low-skill jobs, while skilled workers can be employed in either high-skill or low-skill
jobs. In this context, mismatch is present when skilled workers are willing to accept
low-skill jobs. Blázquez and Jansen [2008] show that the equilibrium is ineﬃcient; too
many skilled workers are employed in low-skill jobs, and ﬁrms create too many highskill vacancies. This suggests an important role for skill mismatch in determining
the distribution of jobs that will be created. Using a continuous characterization of
skill heterogeneity, the model in this paper provides richer predictions for mismatch
tolerance and its implications for vacancy creation.
In a marriage market setting, Shimer and Smith [2000] and Shimer and Smith
[2001] propose a model with two-sided search and continuous, vertically diﬀerentiated agents, as in the current paper. The model is loosely based on the DMP search
and matching environment, modiﬁed such that there is only one group of agents.
The authors impose a log-supermodular production function that does not directly
incorporate a cost of mismatch. Under this production function, the vacancy distribution would be degenerate if it were endogenous; all ﬁrms would choose to create
only the highest skill type of job. However, the authors focus on assortative matching
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by assuming a ﬁxed distribution of agents, so the model cannot be used to address
the relationship between mismatch tolerance and job creation.
Teulings and Gautier [2004] extend the Shimer-Smith model to a labor market
setting with two distinct groups of agents, and specify an increasing returns to scale
matching process in order to approximate the decentralized equilibrium solution. To
obtain a non-degenerate vacancy distribution, the model assumes that each type of
job produces a diﬀerent output good, with prices set endogenously in commodity
markets. However, the productivity function is restricted to be log supermodular,
so skill mismatch still has no impact on match productivity; every worker prefers
to match with the highest job type, and every job prefers to hire the highest worker
type. The empirical literature on skill mismatch has since shown that this is not likely
to be the case, since mismatched workers earn lower wages than their equally-skilled
but well-matched counterparts. I account for this in the current model by estimating
a production function with a direct penalty for skill mismatch, following Lise and
Postel-Vinay [2015] and Gautier and Teulings [2015], among others.
In a related environment with worker and job heterogeneity and on-the-job search,
Lise and Robin [2017] use U.S. aggregate data from 1951-2012 to estimate a stochastic
model. The estimated production function is consistent with the skill complementarity imposed in this paper. The model ﬁts the targeted moments and long-run trends,
but predicts that the skill mismatch is procyclical. That is, workers and ﬁrms become
more selective in accepting matches during recessions. However, a key assumption
used to solve the model is that wages are set by ﬁrms Bertrand competing to hire
workers. As a result, low-type ﬁrms cannot aﬀord to retain high-type workers when
the aggregate state is bad, leading to a mass of separations. While the data does
support an increased separation rate during recessions, Daly and Hobijn [2016] show
that these layoﬀs primarily aﬀect low-wage workers. Under Nash bargaining, the
current model ﬁnds that mismatch is countercyclical and that the changes in average
mismatch are primarily driven by changes in the mismatch tolerance of high-type
workers.
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3.2

Model
I consider a continuous-time, inﬁnite-horizon model with a labor force of measure

1, augmenting the DMP search and matching environment to allow for heterogeneity
on both sides of the labor market in the style of Shimer and Smith [2000].
Heterogeneity.

Workers are risk-neutral and inﬁnitely-lived. They discount

the future at rate r and maximize expected discounted income. A worker can be
either employed or unemployed at any time; all unemployed workers search for jobs,
and there is no on-the-job search. Workers are heterogeneous in skills, indexed by
type x ∈ [0, 1], and vertically diﬀerentiated such that higher x indicates a more
skilled worker. Skills are known, determined at the beginning of life, and ﬁxed for
the worker’s lifetime. The distribution of worker skills in the economy is given by
L(x), with associated density function `(x). The distribution of unemployed workers
is denoted by F (x) (with density f (x)), and is endogenous. The proportion of type
x workers who are currently unemployed is given by the unemployment rate u(x) =
R1
(x)
u f`(x)
, where u = 0 u(x)`(x) dx is the aggregate unemployment rate.
A ﬁrm corresponds to one job1 , and may be in one of two states: matched or
vacant. Matched ﬁrms are those currently employing a worker, while vacant ﬁrms
are those currently searching for a worker. Jobs are heterogeneous and vertically
diﬀerentiated, and indexed by y ∈ [0, 1] representing the job’s skill requirements. The
measure of ﬁrms in the economy is endogenous, as is the distribution of jobs in the
skill space. Let G(y) denote the distribution of vacant jobs. The vacancy rate for
R1
jobs of type y is v(y) = v g(y)
, where v = 0 v(y)`(y) dy is the aggregate vacancy
`(y)
rate. Firms pay a ﬂow cost c(y) to maintain a vacancy, where c(y) is a continuously
diﬀerentiable function. This cost can be thought of as the cost of advertising the
vacancy, interviewing potential workers, and training the new employee.
Match Productivity.

Once ﬁlled, all jobs produce the same output good.

However, the quantity of output produced varies based on the skill types of both the
1

“Firm” and “job” will be used interchangeably.
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worker and the job. Let the quantity of output produced by worker x when employed
by job y be given by ρ(x, y); this is the match productivity. The production function
ρ must satisfy the following properties:
1. ρ(x, y) ≥ 0 ∀(x, y)
2. Given x = x0 , ρ(x0 , y) quasiconcave in y; similarly, given y = y0 , ρ(x, y0 )
quasiconcave in x.
Condition (1) simply imposes a minimum match output of 0. Condition (2) ensures
convexity of match sets. That is, if match (x0 , y1 ) is acceptable and match (x0 , y2 ) is
acceptable, then (x0 , y) must also be acceptable for all y ∈ (y1 , y2 ). Similarly, if job
y0 is willing to match with workers x1 and x2 , y0 must also be willing to match with
all x ∈ (x1 , x2 ).
Job Search. Unemployed workers receive a ﬂow beneﬁt b(x) while searching for
a job. Unemployed workers and vacant ﬁrms know the distribution of agents on the
other side of the market at all times, but are unable to determine the skill type of a
particular agent prior to meeting. Firms and workers meet for “interviews” according
to a matching function, and must jointly decide whether to accept the match or to
continue search.
Let the number of meetings in any period be given by m(u, v), where u and v are
the total measures of unemployed workers and vacant jobs, respectively. Equivalently,
u and v can be thought of as the aggregate unemployment and vacancy rates, since
the economy has a unit measure of workers. The matching function exhibits constant
returns to scale, and satisﬁes the standard assumptions:
1. m is increasing in both the measure of unemployed workers and the measure of
vacant jobs.
2. m is concave.
3. m satisﬁes constant returns to scale.
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4. m(0, v) = m(u, 0) = 0
5. m(u, v) ≤ min{u, v}
Let θ =

v
u

be the market tightness. Then the probability that a vacant type y job

receives an interview in any period is
m(u, v)
= q(θ),
v
and the probability than an unemployed worker receives an interview is
m(u, v)
= θq(θ).
u
Matches are randomly drawn from the distribution of agents on the other side of
the market, so the probability of a speciﬁc worker matching for an interview with a
speciﬁc job is constant across all pairs of currently unemployed workers and currently
vacant ﬁrms. Therefore, workers of all types are equally likely to encounter a job of
type y. However, the probability of a worker meeting a job of type y depends on
the relative measure of vacancies of type y, and therefore is not equal for all y. The
probability of an unemployed worker encountering a job of type y is:
P w (y) = θq(θ)g(y)

(3.1)

Similarly, the probability of a vacant ﬁrm encountering a worker of type x is:
P f (x) = q(θ)f (x)

(3.2)

These equations reﬂect the realization of a random search process; conditional on a
worker (ﬁrm) receiving an interview, the probability of meeting a type y job (type x
worker) must be equal to the proportion of type y vacancies (unemployed workers of
type x) in the economy.
Finally, matches are terminated according to a Poisson process with arrival rate
s, which is constant across all worker-job type pairs. When a match is terminated,
the worker becomes unemployed and must search for a new job.
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3.2.1

Equilibrium

The equilibrium outcome is characterized by the set of unemployment rates for
each type of worker, vacancy rate for each type of job, and wages for all worker-job
pairs. The steady-state equilibrium allocation can be found using the set of worker
and ﬁrm value functions, together with a steady-state condition on the unemployment
rate.
The employed worker’s value function depends only on the wage, the value of
unemployment, and the parameters r and s.
E(x, y) =

w(x, y) + s · U (x)
r+s

Since the contact rate varies across the job type y, the expected value of continued
search must be weighted according to the distribution of vacant jobs.
Z 1
rU (x) = b(x) +
P w (y) · max{E(x, y) − U (x), 0} dy
0

θq(θ)
rU (x) = b(x) +
r+s

Z

1

g(y) · max{w(x, y) − rU (x), 0} dy

(3.3)

0

The ﬁrm’s value functions are similar to those in the Pissarides model, since the
structure of the labor market is essentially the same. I ﬁrst derive the value function
for a ﬁrm with a type y job employing a worker of type x, denoted by J(x, y). V (y)
represents the value function of a ﬁrm with a type y job vacancy.




1
J(x, y) =
ρ(x, y) − w(x, y) + s max V (y) + (1 − s)J(x, y)
y
1+r
Rearranging the above equation yields a value function that is identical to that of the
Pissarides model.
J(x, y) =

ρ(x, y) − w(x, y) + s [maxy V (y)]
r+s

The value of opening a vacancy of type y depends on the cost of opening the vacancy,
c(y), the expected time until the vacancy is ﬁlled, and the expected value of the ﬁlled
job.


Z 1
1
f
V (y) =
−c(y) + (1 − q(θ)) V (y) +
P (x) · max{V (y), J(x, y)} dx
1+r
0
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Firms are able to freely enter the market, opening any type of vacancy at any
time. Therefore, vacancies in each type of job will continue to open until it is no
longer proﬁtable to do so; the value of holding an open vacancy will fall to zero for
all types. The vacancy supply condition is then given by
Z
q(θ) 1
∀y : c(y) =
f (x) · max{ρ(x, y) − w(x, y), 0} dx
r+s 0

(3.4)

Each job type has a distinct vacancy supply condition. It depends not only on the
ﬁrm’s cost of opening a vacancy, but also on the distribution of matching probabilities
and expected proﬁts across available worker types. Firms may create fewer vacancies
in regions of the type space where the probability of being matched with an acceptable worker is low, and more vacancies in regions where the probability of hiring a
proﬁtable worker is higher. Therefore, the unemployment rates of diﬀerent types of
workers will aﬀect vacancy creation rates diﬀerently, depending on how proﬁtable the
match would be.
Wage Determination. Wages are determined by generalized Nash bargaining,
with the worker’s bargaining power equal to β. Hence, the total surplus S(x, y) =
[E(x, y) − U (x)] + [J(x, y) − V (y)] is shared between the worker and the ﬁrm such
that
E(x, y) − U (x) =

β
(J(x, y) − V (y))
1−β

Nash bargaining implies that wages are set such that the interests of the worker and
the ﬁrm are aligned. Therefore, a worker and ﬁrm matched for an interview will
always agree on whether or not the match is acceptable. In particular, matches will
be accepted if and only if E(x, y) − U (x) > 0 (or equivalently, J(x, y) > 0). Imposing
the free entry condition V (y) = 0 and simplifying,
w(x, y) − rU (x)
β
ρ(x, y) − w(x, y)
=
·
r+s
1−β
r+s
w(x, y) = βρ(x, y) + (1 − β)rU (x)

(3.5)
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Substitution yields the following wage setting condition.


Z
θq(θ) 1
w(x, y) = βρ(x, y) + (1 − β) b(x) +
g(y) · max{w(x, y) − rU (x), 0} dy
r+s 0
(3.6)
It is clear that wages depend on the types of both the worker and the job, since
the wage of a pair is increasing in the match-speciﬁc productivity.
In steady state, ﬂows into and out of unemployment must be equal for each type
of worker; ∀ x :
1

Z
u̇(x) = s(1 − u(x)) − u(x)θq(θ)

g(y) · 1(x, y) dy = 0

(3.7)

0

where

1(x, y) = 1 if E(x, y) − U (x) > 0
= 0 otherwise
and indicates whether the worker would accept a job y if matched for an interview.
�

The steady-state equilibrium is deﬁned by {w∗ (x, y)}x,y∈[0,1] , {u∗ (x)}x∈[0,1] , {v ∗ (y)}y∈[0,1] .
While the above equations implicitly deﬁne the equilibrium allocation, it is not possible to solve analytically for the equilibrium values. In the Section 3.3, I calibrate
the model to provide a numerical example of the equilibrium outcome.
Proposition 1. Equations (3.6), (3.4), and (3.7) deﬁne a steady-state equilibrium.
Proposition 2. There is a unique solution for {w∗ (x, y)}x∈[0,1] , {u∗ (x)}x∈[0,1] ū∗ ,
and v̄ ∗ . The set of individual vacancy rates {v ∗ (y)}y∈[0,1] is unique if and only if for
all pairs of distinct job types (yj , y−j ),
� ∗ −1
 �

(y ) (yj ), (y ∗ )−1 (yj ) 6= (y ∗ )−1 (y−j ), (y ∗ )−1 (y−j )
That is, equilibrium vacancy rates are unique if and only if the range of acceptable
matches for job type yj is diﬀerent from the range of acceptable matches for job type
y−j for all pairs of distinct job types (yj , y−j ). Otherwise, there is a continuum of
equilibria, each with a diﬀerent vacancy distribution G∗ (y).
See C.1.1 for a discussion of this proposition.
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3.3

Numerical Example
To illustrate the equilibrium deﬁned by equations 3.4, 3.6 and, 3.7 I solve the

model numerically. Unemployment beneﬁts are linear in x: b(x) = b0 + b1 x. The
meeting function is Cobb-Douglas with elasticity parameter α: M (u, v) = Auα v 1−α .
Match speciﬁc productivity is given by ρ(x, y) = max{x − δ(x − y)2 , 0}. Workers are
distributed according to L(x) ∼ U (0, 1). The distributions of vacant jobs, G(y), and
of unemployed workers, F (x), are endogenously determined.

3.3.1

Calibration

I use the 2009 to 2013 waves of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 to
calibrate several parameters for this example; at this time, respondents are between
the ages of 25-33 years old. A time period in this model is taken to be one month.
Calibrated parameter values used for the numerical example are presented in Table
3.1.

Table 3.1.: Calibrated parameter values
Parameter

Value

Source

b0

0

(Normalization)

b1

0.4

Beneﬁts Accuracy Measurement

r

0.001

3-month Treasury bill

s

0.0299

(Job duration)−1

A

0.9793

Buhrmann (2018)

δ

0.1003

Buhrmann (2018)

α

0.72

Shimer (2005)

β

0.72

Shimer (2005)

For simplicity, workers have no base value of leisure; b0 is set to 0. The monthly
interest rate r is chosen to match the average 3-month treasury bill rate from 2009-
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2013. Other parameters are calibrated using data from the NLSY97 as described in
this section. The average reported job tenure is 33.50 months, leading to a separation rate of s = 0.0299. The U.S. Department of Labor’s Oﬃce of Unemployment
Insurance releases a yearly Beneﬁt Accuracy Measurement report containing each
state’s quarterly UI replacement rate. From 2009 to 2013, the weighted average U.S.
replacement rate was between 0.405 and 0.470. To provide conservative estimates of
the remaining parameters, I set b1 = 0.4.
The worker’s bargaining power β and the matching function elasticity α are taken
from Shimer [2005a]. The scaling parameter A on the meeting function can be calculated using the job oﬀer arrival rate for unemployed workers. Buhrmann [2018]
� 1−α
estimates this at λ = 0.5285. Using the fact that λ = M
= A uv
, I ﬁnd
u
A = 0.9793. The productivity loss from mismatch, δ, is also taken from the estimation in Buhrmann [2018].

3.3.2

Results
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Fig. 3.1.: Equilibrium wage equation.

The equilibrium wage for all worker-job pairs is shown as a contour plot in Figure
3.1a. Wages in this model are consistent with the theoretical results of Eeckhout
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and Kircher [2011]; for a given worker type, wages are concave in job type. Figure
3.1b highlights this shape for selected worker types. As in the one-sided model, the
upper bound of the wage distribution is increasing in the worker’s type, and the lower
bound of the wage distribution is non-monotonic in worker type. The intuition for
this result carries over; workers at the top of the skill distribution are less productive
in lower-skill jobs than workers closer to the average skill type.
Matches are acceptable to both the worker and the ﬁrm if and only if the match
surplus is positive for both parties. This occurs exactly when the productivity of
the match is higher than the bargained wage. Matches such that ρ(x, y) < w(x, y)
will be rejected, and both the worker and the ﬁrm will continue to search for a new
match in the next period. Figure 3.2a plots the worker-job pairs for which wages
are equal to productivity; this bounds the set of acceptable matches. In addition, I
plot the expected occupation type match for each worker type. This line is (weakly)
upward-sloping, indicating that some degree of positive sorting is present. Higherskilled workers are on average matched in higher-skilled occupations, but mismatch
is widespread. In particular, mismatch is highest for workers near the both ends
of the skill space; mid-skill workers experience lower mismatch on average despite
accepting matches with almost all types of jobs. The reason for this is twofold.
First, these workers have more opportunities for relatively low-mismatch jobs simply
because they are near the middle of the skill space. Second, in this example more
vacancies are created at mid-skill jobs, where the probability of an acceptable match
is high. Conditional on being employed, average expected mismatch across all workers
is 0.2186. That is, the average worker is employed in an occupation just over two
deciles from his ideal match. Aggregate output, calculated as
Z 1

Z 1
output =
(1 − u(x))
1(x, y)ρ(x, y)g(y) dy dx
0

0

is equal to 0.4575 in this example.
Skill mismatch aﬀects not only the worker’s wage, but the ﬁrm’s proﬁtability as
well. Figure 3.3 shows a contour plot of match proﬁtability for matches with positive
surplus. Matches on the diagonal, where x = y are more proﬁtable than oﬀ-diagonal
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Fig. 3.2.: Matches and mismatch in the calibrated example.

matches. Proﬁt is more dependent on the skill type of the worker than on the ﬁrm’s
type; for a ﬁrm, hiring a more skilled worker is usually (but not always) preferred.
The most proﬁtable matches are those between high-skilled workers and high-skill
occupations.
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Fig. 3.3.: Match proﬁtability.

The aggregate unemployment rate is 8.71%, slightly above the 8.24% rate in the
NLSY97 data. At 2.46%, the equilibrium vacancy rate is also quite close to the
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Fig. 3.4.: Unemployment and vacancy rates.

target rate of 2.4% from JOLTS data. Equilibrium unemployment and vacancy rates
disaggregated by worker/occupation skill type are shown in Figure 3.4. As with the
equilibrium in the one-sided model, workers near the low end of the skill space are
more likely to be unemployed, and the unemployment rate is (weakly) decreasing in
the worker’s skill level. The primary feature of this model is its ability to generate
an equilibrium distribution of vacancies across the skill space. In this example, the
vacancy distribution is non-uniform. Although the lowest-skilled workers have the
highest unemployment rates, the low proﬁtability of these occupations leads to low
job creation for jobs with skill requirements near 0. Instead, the density of vacant
jobs is higher near the middle of the skill space. Firms’ job creation decision strikes
a balance between the vacancy ﬁlling rate and the expected proﬁtability of a match.

3.3.3

Mismatch Over the Business Cycle

Buhrmann [2018] shows that in the absence of any changes in the vacancy distribution, mismatch falls and positive sorting becomes stronger when the labor market
improves. Does this result change when ﬁrms have a say in matching? To understand the cyclicality of mismatch and sorting, I compare two new parameterizations
representing the years 2009 and 2013. In 2009, the Great Recession was coming to an
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end, but the labor market was far from recovered. Unemployment peaked at 10% in
October 2009, shortly after the vacancy rate bottomed out at 1.7% in August; average
unemployment and vacancy rates over the year were 9.5% and 1.83%, respectively.
By contrast, the average vacancy rate in 2013 was 2.83%, and unemployment fell to
6.07%. Using these values, I impute two new values for A, representing the change
in labor market tightness: A2009 = 0.6514 and A2013 = 0.8271. Figure shows the
equilibrium outcome in each case, with 2009 represented by dashed lines and 2013
represented by solid lines.
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Fig. 3.5.: Equilibrium outcomes in 2009 versus 2013.

Just as in the one-sided search model, workers (and ﬁrms) become more selective
when the labor market improves. This is especially true among high-skilled workers,
whose response to change in labor market conditions is much stronger than that
of low-skilled workers. In the 2009 example, average mismatch among employed
workers is 0.2447 and aggregate output is 0.4500. In the 2013 case, average mismatch
falls to 0.2150, a decrease of almost 13%, while output increases by just over 3% to
0.4636. The vacancy distribution shifts noticeably to the right; although there are
fewer high-skilled workers unemployed, the reduction in mismatch tolerance boosts
the expected match quality of high-skilled jobs making them more attractive to create.
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Relative mismatch tolerance of diﬀerent types of workers has strong implications for
the types of jobs that will be created, illustrating the importance of allowing for
vertical diﬀerentiation of skills in a model of job creation.

3.3.4

Changes in the Distribution of Worker Skills

What happens when the underlying distribution of workers in the economy changes?
We would expect the equilibrium outcome, particularly the distribution of jobs created, to depend on the available pool of worker skills. The skill pool may change
over time if, for example, education rates change, previously productive skills become
obsolete, or workers systematically enter or leave the labor force. A key feature of
this model is the ability to generate a distribution of vacancies that responds to labor
market parameters and, importantly, to the distribution of workers. As an example,
consider a change in the distribution such that the labor supply of low-skilled workers
increases relative to that of high-skilled workers. Speciﬁcally, let
4
L(x) = x
3
1 2
= + x
3 3

for 0 ≤ x ≤ 0.5
for 0.5 < x ≤ 1

be the new distribution of worker skills; the distribution is plotted in Figure 3.6.
In this example, aggregate unemployment and vacancy rates remain close to the
levels in the calibrated example; equilibrium rates are 8.49% and 2.39%, respectively.
However, since there are now twice as many low-skilled workers as there are highskilled, we should expect that ﬁrms will create more vacancies at occupations suited
for low-skilled workers. Although low-skilled jobs are less proﬁtable overall than
high-skilled jobs, more vacancies should be created in this range due to the increased
supply of workers. Figure 3.7 shows exactly that. The vacancy distribution shifts
to the left, with lower-skilled occupations opening more vacancies per worker than
before. The vacancy rate at higher-skilled occupations remains the same, but plotting
job creation in levels emphasizes the diﬀerence; there is a sharp drop in the number
of jobs created in the range y > 0.5.
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Fig. 3.6.: New distribution of worker skills, with more low-skilled than high-skilled.
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Fig. 3.7.: Equilibrium under a skill distribution with more low-skilled workers.
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Fig. 3.8.: Matching under a skill distribution with more low-skilled workers.

The shift in the vacancy distribution changes the mismatch tolerance of workers
and ﬁrms, as shown in Figure 3.8. Relative to the baseline equilibrium, low-skilled
workers become more selective in accepting matches, while high-skilled workers are
less selective due to the reduction in the supply of well-matched vacancies. Average
mismatch across all employed workers increases to 0.2476, and output falls to 0.4549.
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Figure 3.9 highlights the importance of an endogenous vacancy distribution. Match
sets from Figure 3.8 are plotted against those from an environment with an exogenous
distribution of vacancies equal to that in the baseline example. The equilibrium result
allowing for an endogenous vacancy distribution is shown by the solid line, while the
dashed line indicates matches under the exogenous distribution. When the skill distribution of vacancies is invariant to the distirbution of workers, the implications for
workers’ mismatch tolerance strategies and ultimately on sorting and aggregate output are very diﬀerent. In this case, higher-skilled workers are in a better bargaining
position due to the excess supply of high-skilled jobs, and experience a reduction in
expected mismatch instead of the increase that occurs when the vacancy distribution
is endogenous.

3.3.5

Comparative Statics

To understand how the exogenous labor market parameters impact the equilibrium
outcome, this section discusses comparative statics for A, α, β, b1 , and δ.
The replacement rate b1 is the main policy parameter of interest in this model.
Increasing the replacement rate encourages workers to hold out longer for a better
match. This raises expected productivity of a match, which leads to a higher match
surplus for worker and ﬁrm. However, when workers become more choosy they remain
in unemployment longer, producing nothing. The eﬀect on expected output per capita
depends on which of these channels dominates. In Figure 3.10, I show the equilibrium
results of increasing the replacement rate from b1 = 0.4 to b1 = 0.6. Workers become
more selective, indicated by narrower match acceptance regions. Average mismatch
conditional on being employed falls only slightly, from 0.2186 to 0.2182, while expected
output increases from 0.4760 to 0.4818. The unemployment rate increases from 8.71%
to 8.83%, and the vacancy rate increases from 2.46% to 2.50%.
The value of the mismatch penalty δ is taken from the calibration of the one-sided
model in Buhrmann [2018]. Figures 3.11a and 3.11b show the equilibrium allocation
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Fig. 3.10.: Equilibrium with b1 = 0.6.

under a doubling of the mismatch penalty to 0.2006, to illustrate the impact of this
parameter on the equilibrium outcome. As expected, reducing the productivity of
relatively bad matches causes workers and ﬁrms to be more selective; average mismatch falls to 0.1838. The set of acceptable matches for any worker or job is reduced,
causing average unemployment and vacancy rates to increase to 9.51% and 2.71%,
respectively. High-skilled workers respond more strongly to the change, and accordingly experience a greater increase in their unemployment rates. As a result, more
vacancies are created at high-skilled jobs. The increase in unemployment dominates
the improved match quality in this case; output per capita falls to 0.4700.
Like δ, A is calculated based on the GMM estimation in Buhrmann [2018]. To
check the robustness of the model to this calibration, I show the equilibrium results
under an increase in A to 0.95. This represents an increase in the number of matches
created for every level of unemployment and vacancies. Aggregate unemployment
and vacancy rates fall to 6.97% and 1.97%, respectively, but there is no eﬀect on the
shape of these distributions. Average mismatch and output per capita are unchanged.
The value for α and β is taken from Shimer [2005a], which he estimates using
U.S. labor market data from the BLS between 1951-2003. As he notes, 0.72 is some-
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Fig. 3.11.: Equilibrium outcome under δ = 0.2006.
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Fig. 3.12.: Equilibrium outcome under A = 0.95.

what high; Petrongolo and Pissarides [2001] assert that a “plausible” range for this
parameter is between 0.5 to 0.7. To check the robustness of the equilibrium results
to changes in these parameters, I plot the equilibrium outcome setting α = β = 0.5.
The reduction in bargaining power causes wages to fall, and decreases the correlation
between match quality and wage. As a result, workers are less selective in terms
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of the matches accepted. Average mismatch rises to 0.2508, and output per capita
falls to 0.4744. Unemployment falls to 7.0%, and the vacancy rate falls to 2.02%.
As with other parameter changes, high-skilled workers respond most strongly; in this
example, high-skilled workers no longer reject matches with even the lowest-skilled
jobs. The highest-skilled jobs are no longer proﬁtable enough to create; the expected
match quality is too low to oﬀset the high cost of opening these vacancies.
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Fig. 3.13.: Equilibrium outcome under α = β = 0.5.

3.4

Conclusion
This paper proposes a model of labor search with heterogeneous worker and oc-

cupations, random search, Nash bargaining over wages, and endogenous vacancy
creation. The model is based on Shimer and Smith [2000], but features vertically
diﬀerentiated agents and an entry decision for ﬁrms to take the model from the marriage market into the labor market. Workers are born with an exogenous skill type
that determines how productive they can be in various jobs. Occupations are also
described by a skill type, which is chosen by the ﬁrm at the time of job creation. In
general any worker-occupation pair can match and produce output, but the actual
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output depends on the match quality of the pair. When the skill types of the worker
and occupation are similar, match quality is high and skill mismatch is low; better
match quality leads to more output, conditional on the worker’s skill type.
The unique feature of this model is its ability to generate an endogenous distribution of vacant jobs using the ﬁrms’ free entry condition. With the exception of
Lise and Robin [2017], most two-sided labor search models assume that the distribution of vacancies is exogenous (and usually uniform). Results from the calibrated
numerical example show that the distribution of vacancies is likely not uniform, and
depends on the distribution of unemployed workers as well as other labor market
parameters. Models that assume an endogenous vacancy distribution will fail to
capture the full eﬀects of these changes. This is particularly important for policy
analysis, because changes in policies such as unemployment beneﬁts aﬀect welfare
in several ways. Consider the eﬀect of an increase in unemployment beneﬁts. The
obvious channel is through the worker’s ﬂow value of unemployment, which will be
captured by models with a ﬁxed vacancy distribution. However, workers’ mismatch
tolerance strategies inform ﬁrms’ job creation decisions; when workers tolerate less
mismatch, the expected proﬁt of ﬁlled jobs increases. Since high-skilled workers respond more strongly to changes in policy than low-skilled workers, it becomes more
attractive to create high-skilled vacancies and aggregate output increases despite the
rise in unemployment. As a result, the current model will generate diﬀerent policy
recommendations than models with an exogenous vacancy distribution.
In addition to policy exercises, the endogenous distribution of vacancies is key to
understanding changes in the labor market over time or drawing comparisons across
regions or countries. Education, migration, technical change, and changes in social
norms cause the skill distribution of the labor force to vary over time and across
locations. Models that assume an exogenous vacancy distribution fail to capture the
full eﬀects of these changes in the composition of the labor force. As an example,
suppose a region’s labor force becomes more educated over time. Firms will respond
by creating more high-skilled jobs, and may move lower-skilled jobs to diﬀerent re-
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gions. High-skilled workers will enjoy better match quality, increasing their wages,
while low-skilled workers will become less selective in accepting jobs, and as a result
will obtain lower wages on average. This simple example underscores the relevance
of shifts in the vacancy distribution in understanding changes in key labor market
outcomes such as wage dispersion.
This paper explores the interaction between mismatch tolerance and job creation
in an environment where skills are vertically diﬀerentiated and agents use Nash bargaining to split match surplus. The model presented here provides a framework for
that is ideal for applications using new datasets such as the job postings data collected
by Burning Glass Technologies. Using data on occupational vacancy rates, the model
could be estimated and applied to assessing policies such as unemployment insurance
or job creation subsidies, providing a promising avenue for future research.
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A. APPENDIX: SKILL MISMATCH IN FRICTIONAL
LABOR MARKETS
A.1

Proofs

Proposition 1. Setting w∗ (x) = rU (x) as given by equation (1.3),
Z w
∗
e(w|x)
w (x) = b(x) + λ
max{E(x, w) − U (x), 0} dG
w

λ
w (x) = b(x) +
r+s
∗

Z

w

e(w|x)
max{w(x, y) − rU (x), 0} dG
w

Z w
λ
e(w|x)
w (x) = b(x) +
max{w(x, y) − w∗ (x), 0} dG
r+s w
!
Z w∗ (x)
Z w
λ
e(w|x) +
e(w|x)
0 dG
(w(x, y) − w∗ (x)) dG
w∗ (x) = b(x) +
r+s
∗
w
w (x)
Z w
λ
e(w|x)
(w(x, y) − w∗ (x)) dG
w∗ (x) = b(x) +
r + s w∗ (x)
∗

Using integration by parts,
λ
w (x) = b(x) +
r+s
∗

Z

w

w∗ (x)

e(w|x) dw
1−G

To see that the solution to the above equation is unique, I diﬀerentiate both sides
w.r.t. w∗ (x). The derivative of the LHS is clearly positive, and Leibniz rule gives

∂RHS
λ e ∗
(x)|x)
−
1
≤0
=
G(w
r+s
∂w∗ (x)
A.2

Computational Algorithm

The baseline model is solved for the equilibrium reservation wage series {wx∗ }
using an iterative method. Results for expected wages, unemployment rates, etc. can
then be computed using the reservation wages. Each worker’s decision problem is
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independent from that of all other workers, so in practice the problem can be solved
for each worker individually as follows.
1. Create a discrete worker type space X.
2. Invert the wage function w(x, y) to obtain y(x, w). This function will return at
most two ﬁrm types y which will pay worker x a wage equal to w.
3. For each worker type x, transform the ﬁrm cdf G(y) into the cdf of wage oﬀers
e
G(w|x)
using the function y(w, x).
4. For each x ∈ X, iterate on the reservation wage function until convergence.
(a) Guess a reservation wage, for example wx0 = 0.
d
(b) Using wx0 , calculate the ﬂow value of unemployment rU
(x) using equation
1.2.


d
(c) Update the reservation wage guess, for example wx1 = wx0 + 21 rU
(x) − wx0 .
d
(d) Repeat until |rU
(x) − wx0 | is near zero.

A.3

Data

For all calculations using NLSY97 data, a worker-job observation is dropped if:
1. Wage is less than $2/hour, greater than $100/hour, or missing.
2. Respondent worked less than 5 hours per week, or hours/week is missing.
3. Respondent held the job while enrolled in school.

A.4

Calibration

Calculation of the aggregate moments uses NLSY97 data from 2009-2013. The
moments are constructed as follows, and the resulting values are reported in Table
A.2. Custom sample weights are downloaded from www.nlsinfo.org/weights/nlsy97
for individuals who are in any or all of the years: 2009, 2010, 2011, 20134 .
4

The survey shifted to biannual data collection, skipping 2012.
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Table A.1.: Descriptive statistics of the cross-sectional sample, NLSY97, 2009-2013
Description

Statistic

Male

51.32%

Highest degree:
No Degree

7.77%

GED

11.70%

High School

41.06%

Associates

8.27%

Bachelors

22.37&

Masters

6.83%

PhD or Professional

1.85%

Labor Force Participation
Avg. Weeks Worked1

81.67%
35.974

Avg. Enrollment2

10.95%

Any Enrollment3

24.12%

• Average unemployment rate, using weekly employment status
260 P
1 X i 1(ei,t = 0) · ωi
P
u=
260 t=1 i 1(ei,t ≥ 0) · ωi

where ei,t is the unique employer ID (ranging from 9701 to 201313) if individual
i is employed in week t, 0 if unemployed, and -1 if out of the labor force, and ωi
is the custom sample weight.
• Average (monthly) hazard rate
259

H=1−

1 X
1−
259 t=1

∈ {−1, 0} and ei,t+1 > 0) · ωi
i 1(ei,t
P
i 1(ei,t ∈ {−1, 0}) · ωi

P

!52/12

dropping any instances where the individual is returning to a previous employer.
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• Average (monthly) separation rate
s=1−

259 P
6 ei,t+1 ) · ωi
1 X i 1(ei,t =
P
1−
259 t=1
i 1(ei,t > 0) · ωi

!52/12

dropping instances where the individual appears to separate but returns to the
same employer later, since these transitions likely represent vacations, illnesses,
maternity leave, etc. rather than true job termination.
• Average job tenure is calculated in two ways

e
dreport

P P P
di,t,k · ωi
= P P t Pk i
t
k
i 1(di,t,k > 0) · ωi

where di,t,k is the reported job tenure (in months) of individual i in year t at job
k.

e
dspell

P P
k
i di,k · ωi
= P
e
i Ki · ωi

where di,k is the length (in months) of employment spell k for individual i, calculated from the weekly employment status arrays as the number of consecutive
weeks where ei,t > 0 and ei,t = ei,t−1 . Kie is the number of employment spells
observed for i.
• Average unemployment duration
u
dspell

P P
k
i ui,k · ωi
= P
u
i K i · ωi

where ui,k is the length (in months) of unemployment spell k for individual i,
calculated from the weekly employment status arrays as the number of consecutive weeks where ei,t = 0. Kiu is the number of unemployment spells observed
for individual i.
• Letting wim denote the mth percentile of the hourly wage distribution for a skill
percentile bin i, I estimate the max-mean wage dispersion in the data by regressing
zi = β0 + β1 (wi90 − wi50 )
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using the 90th percentile wage rather than the 100th to represent the max wage in
order to correct for potential misreporting and/or extreme cases. The max-mean
wage dispersion ratio is then calculated as
Dm1,m2 =

ẑm1
ẑm2

Speciﬁcally, I calculate the ratio of max-mean wage dispersion between high-skill
to mid-skill workers, D90,50 , and between high-skill to low-skill workers, D90,10 .
Both measures capture the fact that wage dispersion is increasing in worker skill.
• Average accepted mismatch
P P P
µi,t,k · ωi
µ = P P t Pk i
t
k
i 1(µi,t,k > 0) · ωi
where µi,t,k = |xi −yi,t,k | is the mismatch between individual i and the occupation
associated with i’s k th job in year t; xi and yi,t,k are calculated as detailed in
Section 1.2.
• Under the steady state assumption, u =

s
;
s+H

this relationship can be used to

calculate one of u, s, H given the other two.
• Additionally, s and H are equal to the inverse of job duration and unemployment
duration, respectively.
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Table A.2.: Calculated moments and parameters for robustness checks
Moment/Parameter

Value

Method

u

8.24%

* Direct

u

9.0%

BLS

H

0.1823

Direct

H

0.3641

Inferred from u = .0824, s = .0327

H

0.3329

* Inferred from u = .0824, s = .0299

H

0.4599

Inferred from u = .0824, s = .0413

H

0.2273

Inferred from dspell = 4.4

s

0.0327

Direct

s

0.0164

Inferred from u = .0824, H = .1823

s

0.0204

Inferred from u = .0824, H = .2273

s

0.0299

* Inferred from dreport = 33.50

s

0.0413

Inferred from dspell = 24.21

s

0.0310

JOLTS

33.50 months

* Direct (reported)

24.21 months

Direct (spells)

37.2 months

BLS

4.44 months

* Direct (spells)

d

4.29 months

BLS

D9050

1.3772

* Direct

D9010

2.2107

* Direct

µ

0.2256

* Direct

d
d
d

e
e
e

u

d

u

u

e

e

Notes:
* Indicates preferred calibration values used Section 1.4.
BLS statistics are for persons age 25-34, averaged over 2009-2013.
JOLTS statistics are for persons of all ages, averaged over 2009-2013.

105
For values that are not directly available from NLSY97 data, calibration is as follows:
• b(x): Let b(x) = b0 + b1 x. From 2009 to 2013, the weighted average U.S.
replacement rate was between 0.405 and 0.470, according to the U.S. Dept. of
Labor’s Oﬃce of Unemployment Insurance. For consistency with the literature,
I use b1 = 0.4 and set the value of leisure time b0 to 0.
• r: Set to 0.001 to match average 3-month treasury bill rate from 2009-2013.
• λ, δ: jointly calibrated using the method of moments. The available moments
are u, H, D90,50 , µ; however, u and H cannot be used together since they are
directly related in the model.
Table A.3 provides calibrated values of λ, δ from the preferred parameterization,
as well as for selected alternative calibration methods. Using the method of moments,
the targeted moments will be matched exactly; the simulated value of the untargeted
moments are provided as an external check.

Table A.3.: Robustness checks on calibration of λ, δ.
u

H

µ

D90,50

.1003 .5010

* .0842

.3789

.2265

* 1.3772

.1227 .4521

.0943

* .3329

.2187

* 1.3771

.0988 .5158

* .0824

.3891

* .2256

1.3653

.1138 .4413

.0942

* .3329 * .2256

1.4247

.2773 .5637

.0991

λ

δ

.3148

* .1568 * 1.1325

Parameterizations that targeting u provide the best overall ﬁt, with very similar
estimates for λ and δ. The ﬁrst line in the table gives the preferred calibration.
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A.5
A.5.1

Robustness Checks for Stylized Facts
Alternative deﬁnitions of skill type

Tables A.4 and A.5 display the R2 obtained from regressing hourly compensation,
Hi , on percentile rank, zi , for various deﬁnitions of worker and occupation skill types.
Hi = β0 + β1 zi + β2 zi2
This comparison motivates the choice of x pcawgt and y cpsjdm as the preferred
methods of ranking individuals and occupations, since these rankings best predict
average hourly wages.

A.5.2

“Similar” workers with diﬀerent jobs

For x to be a good measure of worker skills, it should be the case that characteristics of workers with the same x do not diﬀer systematically across occupations.
Figure A.1 shows the average age, average birth year, proportion male, and proportion white for workers of similar skill types (deciles of x) in diﬀerent occupations
(deciles of y). Each connected line represents workers in the same decile who are
employed in occupations no more than two deciles away from their own skill type
(since the number of observations in a category decreases substantially beyond this
point). Flat lines indicate that, conditional on skill type, there is no diﬀerence in a
speciﬁc characteristic across occupations.
Figure A.1a shows that, conditional on x, individuals do not systematically sort
into occupations based on their education level. There is positive sorting into occupations on education level, but it is fully accounted for within the skill measure x.
Within a skill type, workers in higher-skilled jobs are not more likely to have higher
levels of education. The other three panels of Figure A.1 suggest that, while there is
clearly variation in the characteristics of workers across diﬀerent occupations, workers are not sorting in any systematic way on the basis of age, gender, or race after
conditioning on skill type.
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Fig. A.1.: Characteristics of similar workers in diﬀerent occupations.
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Table A.4.: Varying deﬁnitions of worker skill type.
R2

x

Ranking deﬁnition

x pca

PCA of individual’s aggregated ASVAB score and highest de-

0.0619

gree
x pcawgt

PCA of scores in 4 math and verabal ASVAB categories and

0.0772

highest degree; scores residualized by race, gender, and 3month age cohort (preferred method)
x act

For individuals with high school diploma or less, aggregated

0.0534

ASVAB score. For others, regress ASV ABi = β0 + β1 ACTi +
β2 ACTi2 + i on scores of all individuals with ACT scores, use
predicted ASVAB score as x value.
x stack

Rank by education level, and within education level rank by

0.0732

aggregated ASVAB score.
x weight

xi = p · ASV ABi + (1 − p) · ASV AB i , where p = 0.8, ASV ABi

0.0551

is respondent’s aggregated ASVAB score, and ASV AB i is average ASVAB score of respondents with same education level
as i.
x optwgt

Same as above, except p is chosen to minimize aggregate mis-

0.0743

match:
(
∗

p = argmin

2013 X
2 X
N
X

)
xi − yi,k,t

t=2009 k=1 i=1

where i is an individual, t is the year, k is a job, and
yi,k,t =y jdm. p∗ = .143; there is a small amount of overlap
between the top of one education category and the bottom of
the next.

A.5.3

“Similar” occupations employing diﬀerent workers

Analogous to the previous section, a good measure of occupation skills would capture all of the characteristics on which workers sort into occupations. Figures A.2a
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Table A.5.: Varying deﬁnitions of occupation skill type.
y

Ranking deﬁnition

R2

y ct

Critical Thinking

0.0936

y cps

Complex Problem Solving

0.1088

y jdm

Judgment and Decision Making

0.1091

y cpsjdm

PCA of Complex Problem Solving, Judgment and Decison

0.1152

Making
y jdmtech

PCA of Judgment and Decison Making, Repairing

0.0752

y cogsk

PCA of all O*NET skill descriptors listed as “cognitive”

0.1129

y cogab

PCA of all O*NET ability descriptors listed as “cognitive”

0.1109

y tech

PCA of all O*NET skill descriptors listed as “technical”

0.0072

y phys

PCA of all O*NET ability descriptors listed as “physical”

0.0419

y social

PCA of all O*NET skill descriptors listed as “social”

0.0552

and A.2b show that the measure of occupation skills is indeed capturing the sorting
of workers according to cognitive skills or abilities. Similarly, conditional on occupation type, higher skilled workers do not sort into occupations requiring systematically
diﬀerent levels of social skills, and in general do not earn higher wages. However,
Figures A.2e and A.2f suggest that there remains sorting of workers on other dimensions. After controlling for the occupation skill type (decile of y), workers with higher
skill types (by decile of x) sort into occupations that require lower levels of physical
abilities and technical skills. This is not entirely unexpected, since the method of
ranking skills was chosen to measure only cognitive skills. To attempt to correct for
this, I included Repairing, a skill highly correlated with other technical skills and
physical abilities, in a principal components analysis and recomputed the rankings of
y. However, under this new ranking, jobs of the same type employing diﬀerent types
of workers systematically varied in wages and cognitive skill requirements. Since the
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Fig. A.2.: Characteristics of similar occupations employing diﬀerent workers.

object is to measure rank occupations by cognitive skills, the original measure is more
favorable.
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A.5.4

Results by Gender
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A.5.5

Results by Race
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A.5.6

Alternative Skill Ranking for Workers

In this section, x optwgt is used.
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A.5.7

Alternative Skill Ranking for Occupations

In this section, y cogskill is used.
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A.6

Wage Growth Transformations

Tables A.6, A.7, and A.8 show the level changes in unemployment rates, mismatch,
and wages by skill group for both the data and the model. In addition, the “Relative
to average” columns show the ratio of changes within a skill group to the average
change, to illustrate the model’s ability to capture diﬀerences across worker groups.

Table A.6.: Unemployment: empirical vs. model predicted change
Level change
Data
Average

Model

-3.47% -2.50%

Relative to average
Data

Model

1

1

Low-skill

-5.12

-3.42

1.48

1.37

Mid-skill

-1.95

-2.07

0.56

0.83

High-skill

-1.60

-1.98

0.46

0.79

Table A.7.: Mismatch: empirical vs. model predicted change
Level change

Relative to average

Data

Model

Data

Model

Average

-.0200

-.0283

1

1

Low-skill

-.0128

-.0189

0.64

0.67

Mid-skill

-.0200

-.0208

1

0.73

High-skill

-.0263

-.0447

1.32

1.58

Comparisons of level changes in unemployment and mismatch are straightforward;
these outcomes have the same units in both the data and the model. However, wages
in the model are normalized and must be transformed in order to compare the model
to the data. Table A.9 shows the level change in wages in the model, as well as two
transformed wage changes.
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Table A.8.: Average wage: empirical vs. model predicted level change
Level change

Relative to average

Data

Model*

Data

Model

Average

$1.60

$1.57

1

1

Low-skill

0.28

1.26

0.17

0.80

Mid-skill

0.91

1.52

0.57

0.97

High-skill

3.13

3.10

1.95

1.98

Table A.9.: Average wage: empirical vs. model predicted % change
Level change
Data

Model

Transformed
Level Percentage

Average

$1.60 0.0021

$2.05

$1.57

Low-skill

0.28

0.0009

1.37

1.26

Mid-skill

0.91

0.0014

1.57

1.52

High-skill

3.12

0.0040

3.03

3.10

Wage changes in the model can be translated into dollars using one of two assumptions. Both rely on mapping the standard deviation of wages in the model to
that in the data, since wage dispersion was a key moment used to calibrate the model.
1. “Level” transformation:
Equate the standard deviation of wages in the model to that in the data.
 data 
σn
model
d
ΔW n = ΔWn
σnmodel
where σn indicates the standard deviation of wages among group n in either the
dn is the
model or the data, ΔWn indicates the level change in wages, and ΔW
transformed wage change.
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2. “Percentage” transformation:
Equate the standard deviation of wages in the model to the standard deviation
of log wages in the data.

 data 
σn
model
dn = exp log(Wndata ) + ΔWn
ΔW
− Wndata
σnmodel
where σndata is now the standard deviation of log wages. The above formula
predicts the new log wage in the data, exponentiates to obtain the wage in
dollars, and subtracts the old wage to obtain the predicted wage change in
dollars. Because of the almost-linear wages in the model, this transformation is
preferred and is used in the main text.
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B. APPENDIX: TARGETED SEARCH IN LABOR
MARKETS WITH SKILL HETEROGENEITY
B.1

Discussion of propsitions.

Proposition: Competitive search is inconsistent with the existence of skill mismatch
in an environment where mismatch is costly to workers.
Under competitive search, identical workers employ identical strategies (either
mixed or pure). Workers are assumed to search for the type of job that maximizes
expected discounted income. When workers play pure strategies, it is not possible
for two identical workers to be employed in diﬀerent jobs. When workers play mixed
strategies, a type x worker must be indiﬀerent between all types of jobs in which type
x workers are observed to be employed. Consider a simple example using two types
of workers and two types of ﬁrms. Let ρi,j be the productivity of a type i worker
at a type j ﬁrm, wi,j be the wage paid, and di,j indicate the expected duration of
unemployment for a type i worker searching in submarket j. Suppose that worker
and ﬁrm types are complements in production; that is, ρ1,1 < ρ1,2 and ρ2,1 < ρ2,2 . If
type 1 workers are employed in both types of jobs, then one of the following must be
true: (1) w1,1 > w1,2 and d1,1 > d1,2 or (2) w1,1 < w1,2 and d1,1 < d1,2 . Similarly, if
type 2 workers are also employed in both types of jobs, we must have (3) w2,2 > w2,1
and d2,2 > d2,1 or (4) w2,2 < w2,1 and d2,2 < d2,1 . It must be the case that either
(1) wages of one worker type are positively correlated with productivity, while wages
of the other type are negatively correlated with productivity or (2) the employment
probability of a type 1 worker diﬀers from that of a type 2 worker in the same submarket. (1) is clearly not true in the data, and additionally cannot be used to rationalize
this issue when there are more than two types. Since meetings in a submarket are
generated by a random matching function, (2) implies that a fraction of matches are
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rejected. Match surplus is given by ρi,j − wi,j , so there are no grounds for rejecting
some workers while employing other identical workers. Data shows that observably
identical workers are frequently employed in diﬀerent jobs and receive diﬀerent wages,
so competitive search can be ruled out.

B.2

Comparative Statics

In this section are comparative statics plots to illustrate the eﬀect of various
parameters on workers’ optimal search eﬀort. Each plot changes one parameter away
from the baseline case of α1 = α2 = (α3 )−1 = 4, c0 = 0.1 shown in the numerical
example. Solid lines represent the optimal search eﬀort, while dashed lines show the
budget constraint c(η) ≤ b(x).
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Fig. B.1.: Optimal search eﬀort across the skill space, varying c0 .

The c0 parameter in the cost function scales the cost of search eﬀort, so higher
levels of c0 tighten the budget constraint, reducing the maximum level of search
eﬀort possible as well as the optimal search eﬀort choice. Figure B.1 shows that
as search eﬀort becomes more costly, all workers choose lower levels of search eﬀort.
When search costs are particularly high, workers whose expected match under random
search is already close to the best match do not target their search at all.
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Fig. B.2.: Optimal search eﬀort across the skill space, varying α1 .

The α1 parameter in the cost function controls the marginal cost of search eﬀort.
α1 < 1 implies a high marginal cost of search eﬀort for η close to zero, and a lower
marginal cost as η increases. α1 > 1 implies a low marginal cost for η close to zero,
which increases rapidly as η increases. As a result, when α1 is low search eﬀort tends
to be quite high for those workers who choose to target search. As α1 falls, search
eﬀort across the skill type space evens out to a moderate level. Note that the budget
constraint also depends on α1 .
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Fig. B.3.: Optimal search eﬀort across the skill space, varying α2 .
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In the σ(η) function, α2 controls the eﬃciency of targeted search, so increases in α2
incentivise more workers to target their search. When α2 is relatively low, targeting
search is not worth the associated costs, but as α2 increases targeting becomes more
valuable.
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Fig. B.4.: Optimal search eﬀort across the skill space, varying α3 .

Finally, α3 represents the marginal cost of targeting search in terms of foregone
job oﬀers. When α3 is low, the oﬀer arrival rate is more sensitive to search eﬀort. As
a result, increases in α3 induce more workers to engage in targeted search.
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C. APPENDIX: SKILL MISMATCH AND THE
EQUILIBRIUM DISTRIBUTION OF VACANCIES
C.1
C.1.1

Propositions
Discussion of Proposition 2

The steady-state distribution of vacancies G(y) is not necessarily unique; the vacancy supply condition determines only the aggregate vacancy rate v̄. However, since
unemployment rates are uniquely determined, the measure of acceptable matches
Z 1
v(y) · 1(E(x, y) − U (x) > 0) dy = G(y(x)) − G(y(x))
0

is pinned down by the steady-state condition on unemployment for each worker type
x.
Now, suppose v(yj ) is increased. Then v(y−j ) must be decreased for some y−j 6= yj
in order to maintain v. For any worker type xi such that a match with either yj or y−j
is acceptable while the other is not, the measure of acceptable matches (and therefore
the probability of exiting unemployment) for that type xi will change. Therefore,
unless both yj and y−j are acceptable to exactly the same set of worker types, G∗ (yj )
and G∗ (y−j ) are uniquely determined. In order for G∗ (y) to be unique for all job types,
it must be the case that the range of acceptable matches for yj is diﬀerent from the
range of acceptable matches for y−j for all pairs of distinct job types (yj , y−j ).
Let y ∗ (x), and y ∗ (x) be the highest acceptable job and lowest acceptable job for
a worker of type x. G∗ (y) is unique if and only if there does not exit a job type pair
(yj , y−j ) such that the set of x that will accept a match with yj is exactly the set that
accepts a match with y−j . This can be summarized as
∀ (yj , y−j ) :

�

 � ∗ −1

(y ∗ )−1 (yj ), (y ∗ )−1 (yj ) =
6 (y ) (y−j ), (y ∗ )−1 (y−j )

(C.1)
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If y ∗ (x) and y ∗ (x) are continuous, the following conditions are suﬃcient to guarantee
uniqueness:
1. ∀ y, (y ∗ )−1 (y) 6= ∅
2. (a) If y ∗ , y ∗ are increasing functions: y ∗ (x1 ) ≤ y ∗ (x2 ) for some x1 < x2
(b) If y ∗ , y ∗ are decreasing functions: y ∗ (x1 ) ≥ y ∗ (x2 ) for some x1 < x2
Condition (1) requires that all job types are accepted by at least one worker type.
Condition (2) ensures that there cannot exist range of job types accepted by every
worker type. If one or both of the match acceptance bounds is not continuous, uniqueness depends on where the discontinuity is, and must be determined by checking that
(C.1) is satisﬁed for all pairs of distinct job types. Under the production function
ρ(x, y) = x − δ(x − y)2 , the boundaries of match acceptance are continuous with
y(0) = 0, so there cannot exist a range of job types that is acceptable to all worker
types.

Solution Method. Given {u∗ (x)}x∈[0,1] and {w∗ (x, y)}x,y∈[0,1] , it is possible to
back out the equilibrium vacancy distribution and corresponding vacancy rates. Let
y ∗ (x), and y ∗ (x) be the highest acceptable job and lowest acceptable job for a worker
of type x. Matches are accepted if and only if ρ(x, y) ≥ w(x, y), so bounds on
match acceptance are fully determined by wages. The steady-state condition on
unemployment,
∗

∗

Z

y ∗ (x)

g(y)dy = u∗ (x)θq(θ)[G(y ∗ (x)) − G(y ∗ (x))]

s(1 − u (x)) = u (x)θq(θ)
y ∗ (x)

determines the probability that a type x worker accepts a randomly drawn job, denoted by φ(x).
φ(x) = [G(y ∗ (x)) − G(y ∗ (x))] =

s(1 − u∗ (x))
θq(θ)u∗ (x)

The worker space is subdivided into three parts as depicted in Figure C.1. For a
worker in the range X1 ,
accept(x1 ) = [G(y ∗ (x1 )) − G(0)]
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Fig. C.1.: Worker type space subdivided based on match acceptance.

G(y ∗ (x1 )) =

s(1 − u∗ (x1 ))
θq(θ)u∗ (x1 )

For a worker in range X3 ,
accept(x3 ) = [1 − G(y ∗ (x3 ))]
s(1 − u∗ (x3 ))
θq(θ)u∗ (x3 )
However, this range overlaps with some job types covered by X1 , so this calculaG(y ∗ (x3 )) = 1 −

tion serves only as a check. Finally, for any worker type in X2 , there must be a
corresponding type in X1 such that
y ∗ (x2 ) = y ∗ (x1 )
Solving for this job type, I obtain G(y ∗ (x2 )) = G(y ∗ (x1 )). Then
G(y ∗ (x2 )) = G(y ∗ (x2 )) +

s(1 − u∗ (x2 ))
θq(θ)u∗ (x2 )

Having calculated G(y) for all job types, it is possible to back out actual vacancy
rates. Using a discrete set of job types as in the numerical example, vacancy rates
can be computed as
v(yj ) = [G(yj ) − G(yj−1 )]/`(yj )
for yj ∈ (0, 1).
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C.2

Computational Algorithm

1. Guess w0 (x, y), u0 (x), and v0 (y).
q(θ0 ) R 1
2. Calculate rU0 (x) = b(x)+ θ0r+s
0

v0 (y)
v0

max{w0 (x, y)−rU0 (x), 0} dy using fsolve

to ﬁnd the ﬁxed point rU0 (x) ∀x.
3. Update to w1 (x, y) = βρ(x, y) + (1 − β)rU0 (x).
q(θ0 ) R 1 v0 (y)
4. Calculate rU1 (x) = b(x)+ θ0r+s
max{w1 (x, y)−rU1 (x), 0} dy using fsolve
0 v0
to ﬁnd the ﬁxed point rU1 (x) ∀x.
5. Update to u1 (x) =
6. Update to v 1 = u1

s
s+θ0 q(θ0 )

R1
0

v0 (y)
v0

1(w1 (x,y)≥rU1 (x))

dy

 Aκ 1/α
r+s

7. Update to v1 (y) by reverse engineering g(y) from match sets and acceptance
probabilities, as described in Appendix C.1.1.
8. Set w0 (x, y) = w1 (x, y), u0 (x) = u1 (x), and v0 (y) = v1 (y) and repeat (2)-(7)
until convergence.

